Passing Your Gun to Your Enemy—Madness or Rationality? Rational Transfers in a Network of Contests
Transferring conflict-resources to an enemy is clearly irrational in a two-agent contest. But it might be possible (in equilibrium) in a network of contests. This article proves that ex-ante conflict resource transfers to a direct opponent can happen in equilibrium, when there is a network of contests. The article also proves the possibility of a portion of the transferred conflict resource getting employed against the transferer in equilibrium. JEL: D72, D74, D85
Authors
- Ajit Mishra (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2003-3796)
- Dripto Bakshi
Institutions
- Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur (IN)
- University of Bath (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Arthaniti-Journal of Economic Theory and Practice
- Published
- 2025-06-27
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1177/09767479251346911
- Primary Topic
- Defense, Military, and Policy Studies
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00