Physical Design-Aware Power Side-Channel Leakage Assessment Framework using Deep Learning
Power side-channel (PSC) vulnerabilities present formidable challenges to the security of ubiquitous microelectronic devices in mission-critical infrastructure. Existing side-channel assessment techniques mostly focus on post-silicon stages by analyzing power profiles of fabricated devices, suffering from low flexibility and prohibitively high cost while deploying security countermeasures. While pre-silicon PSC assessments offer flexibility and low cost, the true nature of the power signatures cannot be fully captured through RTL or gate-level design. Although physical design-level analysis provides precise power traces, collecting data is time and resource-consuming at the layout level. To address this challenge, we propose, for the first time, a fast and efficient physical design-level PSC assessment framework using a graph neural network (GNN). This framework predicts dynamic power traces for new layouts, using them to assess physical design security through metrics evaluation. Our experiments on AES-GF layout implementations achieve a tremendous 133× speedup compared to conventional simulation-based flow without sacrificing substantial accuracy.
Authors
- Farimah Farahmandi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1535-0938)
- Dipayan Saha (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9785-7024)
- Jingbo Zhou (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1375-9644)
Institutions
- University of Florida (US)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-05-25
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/iscas56072.2025.11043283
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Electrostatic Discharge in Electronics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.73