VI—Must We Construct Persons?

Abstract Christine Korsgaard famously argues that even if we accept the metaphysical theory that there are no selves or persons, practical standpoint requires us to think of ourselves as unified over time. It is the ability to choose and deliberate, make plans and act that requires me to construct an identity for myself. This practical requirement is antithetical to the Buddhist no-self view. Buddhists argue that it is primarily the ignorance about our identity that is responsible for suffering, and that this ignorance consists not just in having a false belief in a metaphysical self, but also our ordinary self-conception as being unified across time: our ‘I’-sense, so to speak. The Buddhist project of eliminating, or at least reducing, suffering is concerned with arguments to show that there is no metaphysical self and that the ‘I’-sense is an illusion we must get rid of. If Korsgaard is right, it seems that the Buddhist project is in deep trouble. I shall argue that Korsgaard’s requirement is too strong. The Buddhist project is sound, and Buddhists at all stages of their practice can continue to choose and deliberate, make plans and act.

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Publication Details

Journal
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Published
2025-05-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaf005
Primary Topic
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

VI—Must We Construct Persons?

Monima Chadha
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
article

VI—Must We Construct Persons?

Monima Chadha
article en

Abstract

Abstract Christine Korsgaard famously argues that even if we accept the metaphysical theory that there are no selves or persons, practical standpoint requires us to think of ourselves as unified over time. It is the ability to choose and deliberate, make plans and act that requires me to construct an identity for myself. This practical requirement is antithetical to the Buddhist no-self view. Buddhists argue that it is primarily the ignorance about our identity that is responsible for suffering, and that this ignorance consists not just in having a false belief in a metaphysical self, but also our ordinary self-conception as being unified across time: our ‘I’-sense, so to speak. The Buddhist project of eliminating, or at least reducing, suffering is concerned with arguments to show that there is no metaphysical self and that the ‘I’-sense is an illusion we must get rid of. If Korsgaard is right, it seems that the Buddhist project is in deep trouble. I shall argue that Korsgaard’s requirement is too strong. The Buddhist project is sound, and Buddhists at all stages of their practice can continue to choose and deliberate, make plans and act.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian SocietyVol. 125(2)
University of Oxford (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 85%
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
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