Invisible Leaks: Covert Channel Exploitation in In-Sensor Computing System
In-sensor computing (ISC) represents a paradigm shift in sensor integration technologies. ISC system combines sensing and processing elements on a single chip, enabling real-time processing and reducing computation latency by eliminating massive data transfer and analog-to-digital conversion. However, due to the high integration of sensors and computation units, ISC could suffer from new security attacks that have not been explored yet. In this work, we investigate a covert channel attack that leverages the analog nature of ISC to showcase the feasibility of security attacks and severe consequences in the context of real applications. We envision that this research paper will inspire more researchers to brainstorm new defense mechanisms for the emerging ISC.
Authors
- Mashrafi Kajol (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6791-1675)
- Shehjar Sadhu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4167-5202)
- Wei Lu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4150-8674)
- Kunal Mankodiya (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6423-0823)
- Qiaoyan Yu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7232-8529)
- Dharma Rane (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6741-5559)
- Dhaval Solanki (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4039-4406)
- Md Abdullah Al Rumon (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4413-7896)
- Suparna Veeturi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-3039-744X)
Institutions
- Keene State College (US)
- University of New Hampshire (US)
- University of Rhode Island (US)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-06-27
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3716368.3735259
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 2.48
Funders
- National Science Foundation
- National Institutes of Health