Trust Evolutionary Game Modeling and Strategy Simulation on Regional Cooperative Governance of Air Pollution: A Heterogeneous Perspective

Trust serves as the endogenous driving force in regional air pollution governance, while the heterogeneity among cooperative agents plays a crucial role in achieving trust equilibrium. Despite its importance, this issue has received limited scholarly attention. This study constructs an evolutionary game model of trust under the context of regional air pollution cooperation, incorporating heterogeneity in agents’ economic preferences and income levels. The model is used to examine the evolution of inter-governmental trust and to assess the effects of key parameters on trust equilibrium. Simulation analysis further validates the model and reveals several key findings. The results indicate that the trust equilibrium of regional air pollution cooperation is sensitive to disparities in economic preferences and income levels among governments. Specifically, moderately increasing the compensation for less-developed regions, maintaining the consistency of total income from environmental cooperation and economic preferences, and narrowing income gaps among agents significantly enhance the likelihood of reaching trust equilibrium. Finally, the study provides managerial implications and policy recommendations, offering a novel perspective on environmental collaborative governance and enriching the theoretical toolkit for addressing regional coordination challenges.