Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model of Stakeholders in IoT

As a new paradigm to provide services by acquiring and processing data, Internet of Things (IoT) has become one of the hot topics in academic and industrial areas. In this paper, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting data providers, service providers, and demanders. High quality of service mainly depends on the high quality of data and is important for improving the quality of experience of demanders. The model also considers the collusion between data providers and service providers, which can make it more realistic. To prevent free‐riding and false‐reporting problems, reward and punishment strategies are provided. Finally, the system stability of the equilibrium points of the model is verified through comprehensive simulation experiments, and effective methods are proposed to motivate all stakeholders to choose the best strategy. Through the representative evolutionary game model, the paper provides a new solution to the sustainable development of IoT.

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Publication Details

Journal
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1155/ddns/8592592
Primary Topic
Innovation Diffusion and Forecasting
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model of Stakeholders in IoT

Kaibin Xie
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Innovation Diffusion and Forecasting
article

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model of Stakeholders in IoT

Kaibin Xie
article en

Abstract

As a new paradigm to provide services by acquiring and processing data, Internet of Things (IoT) has become one of the hot topics in academic and industrial areas. In this paper, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting data providers, service providers, and demanders. High quality of service mainly depends on the high quality of data and is important for improving the quality of experience of demanders. The model also considers the collusion between data providers and service providers, which can make it more realistic. To prevent free‐riding and false‐reporting problems, reward and punishment strategies are provided. Finally, the system stability of the equilibrium points of the model is verified through comprehensive simulation experiments, and effective methods are proposed to motivate all stakeholders to choose the best strategy. Through the representative evolutionary game model, the paper provides a new solution to the sustainable development of IoT.

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and SocietyVol. 2025(1)
State Ethnic Affairs Commission (CN), North Minzu University (CN)
National Natural Science Foundation of China, Natural Science Foundation of Ningxia Province, North Minzu University
Openalex Percentile: Top 83%
Innovation Diffusion and Forecasting
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