Regionalism in crisis: Patronage, elite politics, and the fragmentation of West African integration

The complexity of the regionalism in West Africa has to do with the simultaneous goals of promoting integration while also contending with the potential for fragmentation. The latter arises from entrenched patronage networks and shifting external affiliations. This paper examines the ways in which the political elites in weak West African states use patron–client networks and cross-border alliances to strengthen their power, thus undermining the democratic processes and governance systems espoused by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). While it is fundamentally dedicated to collective action and regional stability, ECOWAS faces limitations resulting from the transactional dynamics of politics in the region, where the interests of elites frequently undermine institutional mandates. This paper critically examines how patronage functions as a political currency, sustaining authoritarian practices while simultaneously deepening state fragility and disunity across borders. External alliances often sharpen competition among elites and weaken governance structures, thereby delaying regional efforts rather than fostering cohesion. This work reveals the core dynamics that counter the prevailing narratives of West African integration and implies that the political marketplace in the region is a significant barrier to both democratization and effective regional governance. The findings indicate a need to reevaluate integration strategies, stressing the significance of addressing the established political economies that perpetuate fragmentation and instability.