Risk Perception and Financing/Investment Decision-Making in Concessions Projects under Audit Supervision—Analysis Based on an Evolutionary Game Model

近年来，PPP模式在推动基础设施建设等方面发挥了重要作用，但也出现了诸多问题，于2024年转型成为特许经营模式。本文基于决策者有限理性，结合前景理论，构建审计监督视角下的特许经营项目中地方政府、社会资本和金融机构三方演化博弈模型，并对模型进行演化均衡性分析，以此为例，仿真模拟了不同初始参与意愿、政府补贴方式以及风险偏好对地方政府、社会资本和金融机构策略选择的影响。研究结果显示：研究结论可从决策主体损益感知调节和风险偏好管理方面对促进特许经营项目高质量、可持续发展提出参考。In recent years, the PPP model, while instrumental in advancing infrastructure construction, has encountered significant challenges, prompting its transition to the concessions model in 2024. This study, acknowledging the bounded rationality of decision-makers and incorporating prospect theory, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model. This model involves local governments, social capital, and financial institutions within concessions projects, all under the lens of audit supervision. An evolutionary equilibrium analysis of the model is conducted, and simulations are performed to explore how varying initial participation intentions, government subsidy methods, and risk preferences influence the strategic choices of the three parties. The findings suggest that insights from this study, particularly regarding the modulation of decision-makers’ perception of benefits and losses and the management of risk preferences, can offer valuable suggestions for fostering the high-quality and sustainable development of concessions projects.