Mobile Crowd Sensing Online Quality Awareness Incentive Mechanism Based on Taxation and Data Aggregation

Mobile Crowd-Sensing (MCS) has emerged as a significant approach in various domains for collecting and disseminating sensing data. However, it is a challenging issue to select appropriate participants for a sensing task. This paper introduces a Quality Awareness Incentive Mechanism based on Taxation and Data Aggregation (QIM-TDA), which can choose the reliable participants without losing the platform utility and the data quality. Firstly, we define a reputation model to measure the reliability of participant and select more reliable participants based on their reputation in order to maximize platform utility. Secondly, a truth discovery algorithm is proposed to aggregate the sensing data and ensure the data quality of MCS. Finally, a normalized taxation mechanism is discussed in order to prevent the excessive accumulation of reputation for participant and further enhance the data quality. The simulation results prove that QIM-TDA can significantly improve the data quality and task completion rate compared to some typical mechanisms.

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Published
2024-12-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/msn63567.2024.00015
Primary Topic
Digital Marketing and Social Media
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Mobile Crowd Sensing Online Quality Awareness Incentive Mechanism Based on Taxation and Data Aggregation

Kan Yu, Chuanwen Luo, Wenshuo Ma, Chunmei Yang et al.
Digital Marketing and Social Media
article

Mobile Crowd Sensing Online Quality Awareness Incentive Mechanism Based on Taxation and Data Aggregation

Kan Yu, Chuanwen Luo, Wenshuo Ma, Chunmei Yang, Feng Guang-sheng, Wenhao Zhang
article en

Abstract

Mobile Crowd-Sensing (MCS) has emerged as a significant approach in various domains for collecting and disseminating sensing data. However, it is a challenging issue to select appropriate participants for a sensing task. This paper introduces a Quality Awareness Incentive Mechanism based on Taxation and Data Aggregation (QIM-TDA), which can choose the reliable participants without losing the platform utility and the data quality. Firstly, we define a reputation model to measure the reliability of participant and select more reliable participants based on their reputation in order to maximize platform utility. Secondly, a truth discovery algorithm is proposed to aggregate the sensing data and ensure the data quality of MCS. Finally, a normalized taxation mechanism is discussed in order to prevent the excessive accumulation of reputation for participant and further enhance the data quality. The simulation results prove that QIM-TDA can significantly improve the data quality and task completion rate compared to some typical mechanisms.

Zibo Vocational Institute (CN), Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (CN), Harbin Engineering University (CN), Qufu Normal University (CN), Beijing Forestry University (CN)
National Natural Science Foundation of China, Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province
Openalex Percentile: Top 52%
Digital Marketing and Social Media
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Mobile Crowd Sensing Online Quality Awareness Incentive Mechanism Based on Taxation and Data Aggregation — Kan Yu, Chuanwen Luo, et al. · (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS