Three-party and Multi-Strategy Evolutionary Game in Mobile Crowdsourcing

With the rapid development of mobile crowdsourcing, incentive mechanism has become one of the research hotspots. As participants in the crowdsourcing system, requesters, crowdsourcing platforms, and workers will inevitably have conflicts of interest. The game theory provides a good solution to conflicts, but some existing studies dichotomize the strategies of worker, crowdsourcing platform, and requester. However, some studies only consider the conflict between worker and requester, but ignore that the platform is also a selfish and rational individual. Therefore, this paper proposes a three-party multi-strategy evolutionary game model and analyzes the causes of crowdsourcing dilemma. To solve the crowdsourcing dilemma, a game-based incentive mechanism is designed according to the principle of fair norms. Finally, the experimental results show that the model can reflect the existence of crowdsourcing dilemma in crowdsourcing systems. After adding incentive measures, all participants can evolve in the direction conducive to the stability of crowdsourcing system.

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Publication Details

Published
2024-12-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/msn63567.2024.00105
Primary Topic
Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Three-party and Multi-Strategy Evolutionary Game in Mobile Crowdsourcing

Xi Yin, Zhen Yang, Linzhi Shan, Fuxing Li et al.
Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing
article

Three-party and Multi-Strategy Evolutionary Game in Mobile Crowdsourcing

Xi Yin, Zhen Yang, Linzhi Shan, Fuxing Li, Kaili Zhou
article en

Abstract

With the rapid development of mobile crowdsourcing, incentive mechanism has become one of the research hotspots. As participants in the crowdsourcing system, requesters, crowdsourcing platforms, and workers will inevitably have conflicts of interest. The game theory provides a good solution to conflicts, but some existing studies dichotomize the strategies of worker, crowdsourcing platform, and requester. However, some studies only consider the conflict between worker and requester, but ignore that the platform is also a selfish and rational individual. Therefore, this paper proposes a three-party multi-strategy evolutionary game model and analyzes the causes of crowdsourcing dilemma. To solve the crowdsourcing dilemma, a game-based incentive mechanism is designed according to the principle of fair norms. Finally, the experimental results show that the model can reflect the existence of crowdsourcing dilemma in crowdsourcing systems. After adding incentive measures, all participants can evolve in the direction conducive to the stability of crowdsourcing system.

Yantai University (CN), Shanghai Power Equipment Research Institute (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 68%
Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing
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Three-party and Multi-Strategy Evolutionary Game in Mobile Crowdsourcing — Xi Yin, Zhen Yang, et al. · (2024) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS