Dialectic in Early Proclus and the Unity of the Soul

In Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades, we encounter a conception of dialectic that can be interpreted in terms of the philosopher’s reception of Socratic and Platonic ideas while at the same time being compatible with the relevant Aristotelian conception. We will try to show that this is the case to the extent that dialectic is ascribed a propaedeutic function, aimed both at promoting the search for truth and at practicing and developing persuasive skills that could prove beneficial in theoretical disputes. On this basis, it can become clear that dialectic is related to Proclus’ conception of the soul because it necessarily integrates specific characteristics of partial philosophical disciplines, while, on the other hand, it requires the active participation of the soul as a whole. This means concretely that through the practice of dialectic, the inner differentiation of the soul emerges as a necessary dimension of its coherent unity.