Fair Assignment for Agents with Multiple Weights

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items among heterogeneous agents with a set of weights quantifying their distinct entitlements for different types of items. In this setting, each agent is associated with a preference (utility) function over the items according to its different task processing abilities. To measure the fairness, we explore the multi-weight version of MMS called multi-weight maximin share (MWMMS). In spite of the relatively negative result shown by the counterexample for MWMMS, we present an algorithm guaranteeing that each agent obtains a bundle worth at least <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$1/n$</tex> of its MWMMS for the restricted setting. Finally, based on the fact that the relatively bad approximation occurs only in the polar case, we provide a stochastic variant, where the weights are randomly sampled from the given distribution. Theoretical analysis shows that the <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$1/n$</tex> -approximation can be guaranteed with a desirable probability.

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Published
2025-05-05
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/cscwd64889.2025.11033316
Primary Topic
Auction Theory and Applications
Type
article
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article

Fair Assignment for Agents with Multiple Weights

Zheng Chen
Auction Theory and Applications
article

Fair Assignment for Agents with Multiple Weights

Zheng Chen
article en

Abstract

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items among heterogeneous agents with a set of weights quantifying their distinct entitlements for different types of items. In this setting, each agent is associated with a preference (utility) function over the items according to its different task processing abilities. To measure the fairness, we explore the multi-weight version of MMS called multi-weight maximin share (MWMMS). In spite of the relatively negative result shown by the counterexample for MWMMS, we present an algorithm guaranteeing that each agent obtains a bundle worth at least <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$1/n$</tex> of its MWMMS for the restricted setting. Finally, based on the fact that the relatively bad approximation occurs only in the polar case, we provide a stochastic variant, where the weights are randomly sampled from the given distribution. Theoretical analysis shows that the <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$1/n$</tex> -approximation can be guaranteed with a desirable probability.

Zhejiang University of Science and Technology (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 83%
Auction Theory and Applications
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