Why Disinformation, Fake News, and Conspiracy Theories are not Fiction: A View From Philosophical Aesthetics and Literary Studies

Abstract Within the social sciences, various types of inaccurate or epistemically risky information – including disinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories – are frequently referred to as fiction. In the present article, I argue that this comparison conflicts with how fiction as a broad category of texts is typically defined in philosophical aesthetics and literary studies. First, I define disinformation, misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories, focusing on the extent to which they can be considered as inaccurate information. This is followed by a definition of fiction from the perspective of philosophical aesthetics and literary studies, which can be summarized as ‘intentionally signaled invention’. I then examine whether the various forms of previously mentioned inaccurate information fulfill this definition of fiction. In summary, the types of inaccurate information under investigation are not intentionally signaled inventions, as they either claim to be accurate, or do not make a claim about their truth content. The article closes with implications for psychologists, a discussion of limitations and further considerations.