What does appraisal theory suggest about animal emotions?

In my commentary I expand on the theory-based approach to animal emotions by examining what appraisal theories of emotions suggest about them. I argue that if we assume that core appraisal mechanisms of humans - I focus on the appraisals of motive-congruence and unexpectedness - plus the mechanism underlying the generation of adaptive action goals by appraisals, are innate, then we are implicitly committed to assuming a much larger set of innate components of the human mind. These components include a propositional belief-desire representation system, complete with a basic vocabulary and likely a basic set of beliefs, as well as mechanisms for desire-derivation, action selection and action execution, and a set of basic motives. Because these innate components of the mind are candidates for trans-species continuity, appraisal theory suggests that at least closely related species, and possibly all mammals, share a subset of emotions with humans. Other animal species likely possess nonpropositional analogues of appraisal mechanisms that generate emotion-analogue states. At the same time, even shared "propositional" emotions are expected to show substantial differences between humans and nonhuman animals due to several uniquely human adaptations. These include a far greater number and much more complex concepts, the existence of natural language, and cultural transmission.