Assessing the impacts of oil sanctions on Russia

This paper evaluates the effects of the two most important oil sanctions imposed on Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine—the EU import embargo and the G7 price cap. Using data on prices, discounts, trade patterns and transport, and based on previous research, we assess these sanctions’ individual and combined impacts. We conclude that the import embargo has likely been the most consequential sanction, reducing Russian oil income through a buyer's discount and by increasing transport costs. Furthermore, the price cap has not primarily functioned as a binding price cap, but as a partial transport embargo, reinforcing the import embargo's effects. Going forward, we find that Russian oil revenues are determined by three factors: First, the world oil price is determined by the global supply and demand for oil. Then, the buyer's discount is deducted, which gives the price of Russian oil at the buyer's port. Finally, transport costs are deducted, which provides the selling price in Russian ports, i.e., Russia's oil revenue. Importantly, while all these three factors are in theory determined as one equilibrium, we conclude that in practice they can be treated separately. We briefly discuss specific European and Russian policies that influence these three factors. This paper evaluates effects and workings of the EU import embargo and the G7 price cap on Russian oil. Of the two, the import embargo has been the most consequential. The price cap has not functioned as a binding price cap, but as a partial transport embargo. The two sanctions have reinforced each other. Total Russian losses are at least 0.9 % of Russian GDP (conservative assessment). A simplified equation determining Russian oil income under sanctions is presented. Specific European and Russian policies that influence Russian oil income are discussed.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Energy Policy
Published
2025-06-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2025.114739
Citations
6
Primary Topic
Economic Sanctions and International Relations
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
18.79
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Assessing the impacts of oil sanctions on Russia

Daniel Spiro, Johan Gars, Henrik Wachtmeister
6 citations
Energy Policy
Economic Sanctions and International Relations
18.79
article

Assessing the impacts of oil sanctions on Russia

Daniel Spiro, Johan Gars, Henrik Wachtmeister
article en
6 citations

Abstract

This paper evaluates the effects of the two most important oil sanctions imposed on Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine—the EU import embargo and the G7 price cap. Using data on prices, discounts, trade patterns and transport, and based on previous research, we assess these sanctions’ individual and combined impacts. We conclude that the import embargo has likely been the most consequential sanction, reducing Russian oil income through a buyer's discount and by increasing transport costs. Furthermore, the price cap has not primarily functioned as a binding price cap, but as a partial transport embargo, reinforcing the import embargo's effects. Going forward, we find that Russian oil revenues are determined by three factors: First, the world oil price is determined by the global supply and demand for oil. Then, the buyer's discount is deducted, which gives the price of Russian oil at the buyer's port. Finally, transport costs are deducted, which provides the selling price in Russian ports, i.e., Russia's oil revenue. Importantly, while all these three factors are in theory determined as one equilibrium, we conclude that in practice they can be treated separately. We briefly discuss specific European and Russian policies that influence these three factors. This paper evaluates effects and workings of the EU import embargo and the G7 price cap on Russian oil. Of the two, the import embargo has been the most consequential. The price cap has not functioned as a binding price cap, but as a partial transport embargo. The two sanctions have reinforced each other. Total Russian losses are at least 0.9 % of Russian GDP (conservative assessment). A simplified equation determining Russian oil income under sanctions is presented. Specific European and Russian policies that influence Russian oil income are discussed.

Energy PolicyVol. 206
Uppsala University (SE), Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (SE), Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SE)
Openalex Percentile: Top 1%
Economic Sanctions and International Relations
18.79
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.