Unveiling the driving mechanism of greenwashing behaviors: an agent-based modeling approach integrating new institutionalism and halo effect theories

Governing the greenwashing behaviors of construction material enterprises under the sustainable development goals is imminent. Although government regulation and public scrutiny are regarded as crucial tools for addressing greenwashing, the specific mechanisms for managing greenwashing in construction material enterprises remain unclear. The objective of this study is to elucidate the governance mechanisms of government regulation and public scrutiny, and to explore their synergies in addressing the issue of greenwashing behaviors exhibited by construction material enterprises. This study employs an agent-based modeling approach, drawing upon new institutionalism theory and the halo effect theory, to examine the key factors that contribute to greenwashing behaviors. The main conclusions are as detailed below. (1) In the absence of government regulation and public scrutiny, the number of greenwashing construction material enterprises is increasing exponentially. (2) When only government regulation is considered, the combined government strategy has a greater impact on governance than penalties or subsidies alone. (3) When only public scrutiny is considered, the greenwashing behaviors of construction material enterprises cannot be controlled. (4) When both government regulation and public scrutiny are considered, the combined governance impact is greater than the effect of either alone. The ant colony model in computational experiments is introduced into the research of greenwashing behaviors, which provides a new model and novel idea for investigating greenwashing. Furthermore, this analysis offers a potentially valuable reference for the government in formulating specific guidance policies and strategies for engaging the public.