When Do Guardians Deter Offending? An Experimental Test of Informal Social Control Mechanisms

Abstract Purpose To inform community theories of informal social control, we test the circumstances under which private citizens can be effective in deterring would-be offenders and identifying characteristics and motivations of citizens willing to assume this role. Methods We conducted 447 trials of an online laboratory experiment with monetary incentives in which participants were randomly assigned to one of three roles: Target, Guardian, or Thief. Thieves could steal from Targets but Guardians could pay to punish Thieves for taking. We observe rates of theft while randomizing the presence of Guardians and their number, the cost of punishment for the Guardian, and the maximum punishment by Guardians. We also measured participant regard for others. Results Potential offenders were deterred by punishments provided punishment potentially exceeded the rewards of offending but only when their regard for the welfare of others was low. Potential offenders with high regard for the welfare of others were unlikely to offend regardless of the threat of punishment. The pronounced interaction between deterrence and regard for others is notable because the main effect of regard for others is far larger than the main effect of the threat of punishment. The impact of regard for the welfare of others also extended to guardians. Guardians were willing to punish infractions even if punishing was costly for them and did so more often when their regard for others was higher. Conclusions The risk that a community member might intervene on behalf of a victim deters others from offending, however regard for the welfare others had a far larger impact on taking decisions than the capacity of guardians to punish. We discuss implications for community interventions with deterrence components.