Study of a Power Market Bidding Game Model Considering Demand-Side Resource Regulation Potential

This paper develops a game-theoretic model for electricity market bidding that explicitly incorporates the regulation potential of demand-side resources. We formulate a non-cooperative bidding game between generation companies and a demand response aggregator, with each participant aiming to maximize its profit. A mathematical model is constructed, and the market clearing condition is derived through Nash equilibrium analysis and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. An optimization-based solution method is used to compute the market equilibrium. Simulation studies illustrate how demand response influences market outcomes. The results show that integrating demand-side flexibility lowers market clearing prices, rebalances supply and demand, and improves overall efficiency. We compare scenarios with and without demand response and analyze price trajectories, supply–demand curves, and equilibrium outcomes. The findings highlight the stabilizing effect of demand-side participation and offer insights into policy measures for demand response integration.