Spatiotemporal optimization and coordination of integrated energy systems based on non-cooperative game equilibrium

The core of dynamic electricity price optimization of integrated energy systems lies in the flexible electricity price to guide the consumption of the active load. Based on the current mainstream time-of-use electricity price, this paper takes the agent platform economy maximization and the follower goal as the user’s electricity cost minimization as the goal. Through the new dynamic electricity price mechanism, it guides flexible load users to actively participate in the operation of the power grid and highlights the autonomy of each subject in IES. In order to achieve this goal, the Stackelberg game model is first established for the IES system. Then the complementary relaxation condition is used for linearization to transform the game model into a mixed integer linear programming model. Finally, the power time distribution results are brought into the mixed integer second-order cone optimization model of the power grid flow for spatial collaborative optimization. Finally, the impact of incentive policy on dynamic electricity prices is quantitatively discussed through examples. It can be concluded that by providing reasonable incentive compensation for electricity prices, the cost of users’ direct electricity purchase can be effectively reduced, which is a win-win dynamic electricity price adjustment method for users and platforms.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Published
2025-04-11
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/icgeps65133.2025.11034471
Primary Topic
Integrated Energy Systems Optimization
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Spatiotemporal optimization and coordination of integrated energy systems based on non-cooperative game equilibrium

Qigong Chen, Yang Lü, Xiaoxin Zhang
Integrated Energy Systems Optimization
article

Spatiotemporal optimization and coordination of integrated energy systems based on non-cooperative game equilibrium

Qigong Chen, Yang Lü, Xiaoxin Zhang
article en

Abstract

The core of dynamic electricity price optimization of integrated energy systems lies in the flexible electricity price to guide the consumption of the active load. Based on the current mainstream time-of-use electricity price, this paper takes the agent platform economy maximization and the follower goal as the user’s electricity cost minimization as the goal. Through the new dynamic electricity price mechanism, it guides flexible load users to actively participate in the operation of the power grid and highlights the autonomy of each subject in IES. In order to achieve this goal, the Stackelberg game model is first established for the IES system. Then the complementary relaxation condition is used for linearization to transform the game model into a mixed integer linear programming model. Finally, the power time distribution results are brought into the mixed integer second-order cone optimization model of the power grid flow for spatial collaborative optimization. Finally, the impact of incentive policy on dynamic electricity prices is quantitatively discussed through examples. It can be concluded that by providing reasonable incentive compensation for electricity prices, the cost of users’ direct electricity purchase can be effectively reduced, which is a win-win dynamic electricity price adjustment method for users and platforms.

Jiangnan University (CN), Anhui Polytechnic University (CN)
Affordable and clean energy
Openalex Percentile: Top 88%
Integrated Energy Systems Optimization
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.