Behavioral Inhibition Mechanisms and Policy Implications of the Tripartite Game of Non-State Financial Institutions under Government Audit Intervention

为防止非国有金融机构与内部审计部门和社会审计机构的合谋、舞弊等行为。本文基于博弈理论，分析信息不对称条件下的非国有金融机构舞弊行为，构建三方收益矩阵模型，并计算其纳什均衡解，将政府审计作为变量，对比引入政府审计和未引入政府审计时的博弈过程，通过分析得出：政府审计机关能够有效遏制非国有金融机构的舞弊行为，降低内部审计部门和社会审计机构的合谋概率。In order to prevent non-state-owned financial institutions from collusion and fraud with internal audit departments and social audit institutions, this paper analyzes the fraudulent behavior of non-state-owned financial institutions under the condition of information asymmetry based on game theory, constructs the tripartite benefit matrix model, and calculates its Nash equilibrium solution, takes the government audit as a variable, and compares the game process between the introduction of the government audit and the introduction of the government audit, and through the analysis, it is concluded that: the government audit authority can effectively curb the fraudulent behavior of non-state financial institutions, and reduce the probability of collusion of the internal audit department and social audit institutions.