Even Bigger-Picture Causalism

Abstract Causalism about action explains what an action is in terms of its causes. Causalism about free action explains what a free action is in terms of its causes. Carolina Sartorio (2023) suggests that they add up into ‘big-picture causalism’. This paper develops an even bigger-picture causalism. The central addition comes from the distinction between structural and substantive rationality. The problem of the disappearing agent is raised for Sartorio’s causalism about action, and a solution based on dispositions of structural rationality is presented. However, such dispositions are neither necessary nor sufficient for free action. As Sartorio suggests, we should rather appeal to a disposition of substantive rationality or reasons-responsiveness (and some extra qualifications) to capture free action. But by combining the two types of rationality, we capture a broader range of types of control than Sartorio—and develop an even bigger-picture causalism that features action, free action, and rational action.

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Publication Details

Journal
Acta Analytica
Published
2025-06-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-025-00647-1
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Free Will and Agency
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.43

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article

Even Bigger-Picture Causalism

Olof Leffler
1 citations
Acta Analytica
Free Will and Agency
1.43
article

Even Bigger-Picture Causalism

Olof Leffler
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Abstract Causalism about action explains what an action is in terms of its causes. Causalism about free action explains what a free action is in terms of its causes. Carolina Sartorio (2023) suggests that they add up into ‘big-picture causalism’. This paper develops an even bigger-picture causalism. The central addition comes from the distinction between structural and substantive rationality. The problem of the disappearing agent is raised for Sartorio’s causalism about action, and a solution based on dispositions of structural rationality is presented. However, such dispositions are neither necessary nor sufficient for free action. As Sartorio suggests, we should rather appeal to a disposition of substantive rationality or reasons-responsiveness (and some extra qualifications) to capture free action. But by combining the two types of rationality, we capture a broader range of types of control than Sartorio—and develop an even bigger-picture causalism that features action, free action, and rational action.

Acta Analytica
University of Siena (IT)
Università degli Studi di Siena, University of Leeds, European Commission
Peace, Justice and strong institutions, Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 18%
Free Will and Agency
1.43
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