Three arguments against metaphysical structuralism in consciousness research

Abstract Phenomenal structuralism is the view that understanding consciousness requires describing its relational and structural properties, a perspective that can have implications for both explaining why experiences feel the way they do and identifying the neural correlates of consciousness. Phenomenal structuralism has gained considerable traction in recent years, with proponents advocating for its adoption as a new paradigm for consciousness science. This paper distinguishes three types of structuralism in consciousness studies: methodological, epistemological, and metaphysical. I critically evaluate metaphysical structuralism, which asserts that the phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its relational properties. I present three arguments challenging this metaphysical claim, demonstrating its inadequacy. I also claim, however, that this critique does not affect the fruitfulness of methodological and epistemological structuralism. This analysis clarifies the limits and prospects of the structuralist approach, emphasizing that methodological and epistemological structuralism can contribute to consciousness science without heavy and counterintuitive metaphysical commitments.