SSTAF: Security Settings-Based Threat Assessment Framework of Programmable Logic Controllers

Industrial control systems (ICSs) govern the production activities of various critical infrastructures, where programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are essential devices for controlling industrial processes. However, PLCs have many vulnerabilities and might be configured inappropriately. With the trend of PLCs connecting to the Internet, such weaknesses will lead to various cyberattacks and have prompted many studies on the threat assessment for PLCs. Previous research has ignored PLCs’ security settings, such as operating mode and read/write authentication etc., which are the general security functionalities significantly affecting PLCs’ security. In this paper, we make the first attempt to propose a security settings-based threat assessment framework (<italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">SSTAF</i>) to assess PLCs’ security. <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">SSTAF</i> consists of <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">SScanner</i>, a novel scanner to automatically extract the real-time configurations of security settings from PLCs, and the threat assessment criteria, serving to assess the appropriateness of PLC configurations and analyze risk levels of attacks based on PLCs’ security settings. Subsequently, using <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">SSTAF</i>, we implement an Internet-wide threat assessment for PLCs exposed to the Internet. We deploy <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">SScanner</i> on the Internet and interact with 41K ICS devices in cyberspace to acquire their configurations of security settings. Based on the scanning result and the threat assessment criteria, we reveal that 93.32% of PLCs have not appropriately configured their security settings. Additionally, each PLC might be subject to 4.96 attacks on average, of which 3.32 attacks are due to the inappropriate configurations of security settings.

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Publication Details

Journal
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2025.3581434
Citations
3
Primary Topic
Security and Verification in Computing
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
7.44

Funders

Controls
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article

SSTAF: Security Settings-Based Threat Assessment Framework of Programmable Logic Controllers

Jianying Zhou, Zhenyong Zhang, Zeyu Yang, Peng Cheng et al.
3 citations
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Security and Verification in Computing
7.44
article

SSTAF: Security Settings-Based Threat Assessment Framework of Programmable Logic Controllers

Jianying Zhou, Zhenyong Zhang, Zeyu Yang, Peng Cheng, Ruilong Deng, Hengye Zhu, Jie Meng
article en
3 citations

Abstract

Industrial control systems (ICSs) govern the production activities of various critical infrastructures, where programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are essential devices for controlling industrial processes. However, PLCs have many vulnerabilities and might be configured inappropriately. With the trend of PLCs connecting to the Internet, such weaknesses will lead to various cyberattacks and have prompted many studies on the threat assessment for PLCs. Previous research has ignored PLCs’ security settings, such as operating mode and read/write authentication etc., which are the general security functionalities significantly affecting PLCs’ security. In this paper, we make the first attempt to propose a security settings-based threat assessment framework (<italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">SSTAF</i>) to assess PLCs’ security. <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">SSTAF</i> consists of <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">SScanner</i>, a novel scanner to automatically extract the real-time configurations of security settings from PLCs, and the threat assessment criteria, serving to assess the appropriateness of PLC configurations and analyze risk levels of attacks based on PLCs’ security settings. Subsequently, using <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">SSTAF</i>, we implement an Internet-wide threat assessment for PLCs exposed to the Internet. We deploy <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">SScanner</i> on the Internet and interact with 41K ICS devices in cyberspace to acquire their configurations of security settings. Based on the scanning result and the threat assessment criteria, we reveal that 93.32% of PLCs have not appropriately configured their security settings. Additionally, each PLC might be subject to 4.96 attacks on average, of which 3.32 attacks are due to the inappropriate configurations of security settings.

IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and SecurityVol. 20
Singapore University of Technology and Design (SG), Guizhou University (CN), State Key Laboratory of Industrial Control Technology (CN)
National Natural Science Foundation of China, State Key Laboratory of Industrial Control Technology, Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province
Climate action
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Security and Verification in Computing
7.44
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