To Elect or Appoint? Evidence from Local Election Administration

Do elected or appointed local officials produce better outcomes for their constituents? Elections should improve representation by providing a direct link to voters. However, some argue that citizens have too little information to select good leaders and hold them accountable, especially at the local level. In order to assess these conflicting claims, I examine the performance of local election officials, an office that has come under immense strain to deliver democratic elections and for which selection method is a live policy debate. Using an original collection of election administration structures in 1,116 counties across 13 states and 62 years, I leverage changes in selection method to credibly measure differences in election outcomes produced by elected and appointed local election officials. I find that appointed officials out-perform their elected counterparts, increasing voter turnout by 1 to 2 percentage points and raising registration rates as well. Appointed officials appear to boost election administration resources, more actively communicate with voters, and reduce voter wait times. I present evidence that the quality of selection and sanctioning are higher for appointed officials, leading to better educated and more closely monitored agents. My findings speak to the challenges in designing local institutions that advance democratic ideals.