Frames, incentives, and education: Effectiveness of interventions to delay public pension claiming
In many retirement income systems, people forgo a higher stream of public pension income by claiming early. This paper provides survey- and quasi-experimental evidence on how increasing financial incentives, educating individuals, and changing the framing of the claiming decision affect pension claiming and the present value of expected pension benefits. We find that all three types of interventions induce delays, but they have heterogeneous financial consequences. Educating participants about the claiming decision and life expectancy leads to claiming ages with higher pension wealth. In contrast, changing the framing of the claiming decision and strengthening financial incentives do not improve, and may even worsen, financial outcomes. • Many people forgo higher streams of public pension income by claiming early. • We study how increasing financial incentives, educating individuals, and changing the framing of the claiming decision affect pension claiming and pension wealth. • All three types of interventions induce delays, but they have heterogeneous financial consequences. • Educating individuals about the claiming decision and life expectancy increase pension wealth. • Changing the framing of the claiming decision and increasing financial incentives tend to worsen financial outcomes.
Authors
- Franca Glenzer
- Stefan Staubli
- Pierre‐Carl Michaud (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3114-4229)
Institutions
- HEC Montréal (CA)
- University of Calgary (CA)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Public Economics
- Published
- 2025-06-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105419
- Citations
- 2
- Primary Topic
- Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 7.82
Funders
- Social Science Research Council
- Fonds de Recherche du Québec-Société et Culture
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada