Lyapunov-Certified Resilient Secondary Defense Strategies of AC Microgrids Under Exponentially Energy-Unbounded FDI Attacks

This letter presents fully distributed Lyapunov-certified resilient secondary defense strategies for islanded inverter-based AC microgrids, designed to counter a broad spectrum of exponentially energy-unbounded false data injection (EEU-FDI) attacks, targeting control input channels. While distributed control improves scalability and reliability, it also increases susceptibility to cyber threats. The proposed defense strategies, supported by rigorous Lyapunov-based proofs, ensure uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) convergence for frequency regulation, voltage containment, and power sharing, even under EEU-FDI attacks. The effectiveness of the proposed defense strategies has been demonstrated through case studies on a modified IEEE 34-bus system, leveraging simulations and real-time controller hardware-in-the-loop experiments using OPAL-RT.