Coping With Competing Institutional Logics in Policy Implementation

ABSTRACT While recent research has studied the coping behaviors of street‐level bureaucrats (SLBs), less attention has been paid to the institutional antecedents of these coping behaviors. This paper examines how macro‐level institutional factors—specifically, competing institutional logics—shape SLBs' meso‐level organizational conflicts and micro‐level coping behaviors. We use semi‐structured interviews and archival data to investigate environmental policy implementation in China, where developmental state logic and regulatory state logic coexist and compete. We found that regulatory state logic increases SLBs' workloads and accountability, while developmental state logic limits their power and resources. These competing institutional logics result in unclear responsibilities, expanding the number of tasks but constraining resources, creating pressure for enforcement officials while providing few rewards. In response, SLBs engage in active and passive coping behaviors. Our study contributes to public administration and institutional theory research by introducing a multi‐level framework that links competing logics to organizational conflicts and individual coping.