Masquerading IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol: Cyber‐Physical Experiments and Detection
In a Hardware-in-the-Loop digital substation, we show that a network attacker can spoof a GOOSE trip to open a breaker.We propose two detectors-one machine-learning, one rule-based-and illustrate both attack and defense in an interactive demo for awareness.
Authors
- Idy Diop (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9143-196X)
- Veit Hagenmeyer (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3572-9083)
- Ghada Elbez (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1137-1782)
- Jean Marie Dembélé (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6729-2915)
- Gustavo Sánchez (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6634-8315)
- Hermenegildo da Conceição Alberto (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0000-6403-8268)
Institutions
- Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (DE)
- Université Gaston Berger (SN)
- Cheikh Anta Diop University (SN)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-06-16
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3679240.3734685
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00