Do Syndicated Loan Borrowers Trade-Off Real Activities Manipulation with Accrual-Based Earnings Management?

This study investigates how managers choose between alternative earnings management mechanisms among syndicated loan borrowers. Specifically, it examines the trade-off between accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and real activities manipulation (RAM) during the period leading up to syndicated loan origination. The study also explores whether lender monitoring mechanisms influence subsequent earnings management behavior. The syndicated loan market, positioned between the private and public fixed income markets, offers a distinctive context for analyzing these strategic decisions. Using a propensity score-matched sample of syndicated and bilateral loans issued between 1989 and 2005, the study finds that firms obtaining syndicated loans are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation beforehand, relying more heavily on AEM than on RAM. Further analysis reveals that monitoring mechanisms—such as lender reputation, the number of syndicate members, loan size, and loan maturity—are significantly associated with future changes in AEM but show a weaker relationship with changes in RAM.