Battle of El Salheya (1798): How Napoleon Turned Failure into Victory

The author of this article analyses the mechanism Napoleon elaborated in his memoirs to create the most advantageous version of the Egyptian campaign of 1798–1799 for him, considering the example of the battle of El Salheya on August 11, 1798. This military clash is presented in Napoleon’s work as an indisputable success of French weapons. According to his version, a relatively small French cavalry detachment consisting of hussars, mounted chasseurs, and dragoons launched several successful attacks against the vastly superior Mamluk forces and recaptured a significant part of the convoy of Ibrahim Bey, the de facto co-ruler of Egypt. Napoleon, however, casually admits that the French suffered significant losses in the “last” of such attacks, but blames Colonel Lasalle for it, as he allegedly undertook it on his own initiative, craving the treasures of Ibrahim Bey. The author of the article deconstructs Napoleon’s version by comparing it with the testimonies of six other participants in the battle of El Salheya, i.e. officers of Bonaparte’s army head staff and cavalrymen who directly clashed with the Mamluks. According to the testimonies of all these people, the battle of El Salheya was a great setback for the French army. In the only cavalry attack launched by Bonaparte himself against an approximately equivalent Mamluk detachment, the French, who were significantly inferior to the enemy in terms of weapons and combat training, suffered heavy losses. The only thing that saved the French cavalry from complete destruction was the enemy’s unwillingness to prolong the battle and their desire to take away Ibrahim Bey’s caravan to Syria as soon as possible. However, describing these events in his memoirs, Napoleon, without violating the general outline of events, presented a picture of the past favourable for himself, skillfully “correcting” the details and placing accents in his own way.