“Nussbaum’s Critique of Rawls on Animals”

Abstract: In this paper, I will reconstruct and evaluate Martha Nussbaum’s critique of John Rawls on the political status of nonhuman animals. Nussbaum’s criticisms go beyond pointing out the inadequacy of Rawls’s own view on the issue of nonhuman animals. Rather, she thinks that the Rawlsian social contract cannot plausibly be used to adequately construe humans as having duties of justice to nonhuman animals. I will review attempts in the secondary literature on Rawls and nonhuman animals that are most relevant to Nussbaum’s criticisms and argue that there are plausible resources to defend Rawls against these objections, at least in terms of the possibility of his theory being modified to go beyond his own view in a helpful way. The conclusion is that Nussbaum’s arguments are not decisive against Rawls, so her own theory will be a rival rather than a nonrival to the Rawlsian social contract tradition on the issue of duties of justice to nonhuman animals. Even so, the theories can be allies in advocating for animal rights.