Impact of peer pressure on cooperation evolution in the networked prisoner’s dilemma game with migration mechanisms

Abstract In social and ecological systems, individual migration behavior and peer pressure are crucial factors influencing decision-making and cooperative behavior. However, how migration regulates the evolution of cooperation and the specific role of peer pressure in this process remain to be further investigated. To address this, this study develops a model that incorporates migration mechanisms and peer pressure within the framework of the networked prisoner’s dilemma game. Specifically, we modify the population structure and introduce a migration strategy based on payoff maximization, enabling individuals to dynamically adjust their positions according to the local environment. The model also considers the impact of peer pressure on individual decision-making and introduces heterogeneity in individuals’ sensitivity to pressure, thereby systematically examining the role of both factors in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Based on this framework, we further compare our model with a scenario in which no migration mechanism is present to evaluate its impact on cooperative dynamics. The results reveal that the migration mechanism significantly promotes the evolution of cooperative behavior. Under this mechanism, higher individual sensitivity leads to an increased level of cooperation, and stronger peer pressure intensity more effectively enhances the promotion of cooperation. Additionally, the influence of population structure on cooperation frequency cannot be overlooked. An increase in vacant nodes provides cooperators with greater buffering space and more migration opportunities, making cooperative behavior more stable and facilitating its propagation within the system. These findings suggest that appropriately regulating individual mobility and reinforcing peer pressure constraints can enhance the stability and propagation of cooperative behavior, providing significant theoretical support for social governance, organizational management, and group collaboration.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Chinese Physics B
Published
2025-06-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1088/1674-1056/ade425
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Impact of peer pressure on cooperation evolution in the networked prisoner’s dilemma game with migration mechanisms

Xianjia Wang, Yanan Li, Zhensen Yang
Chinese Physics B
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

Impact of peer pressure on cooperation evolution in the networked prisoner’s dilemma game with migration mechanisms

Xianjia Wang, Yanan Li, Zhensen Yang
article en

Abstract

Abstract In social and ecological systems, individual migration behavior and peer pressure are crucial factors influencing decision-making and cooperative behavior. However, how migration regulates the evolution of cooperation and the specific role of peer pressure in this process remain to be further investigated. To address this, this study develops a model that incorporates migration mechanisms and peer pressure within the framework of the networked prisoner’s dilemma game. Specifically, we modify the population structure and introduce a migration strategy based on payoff maximization, enabling individuals to dynamically adjust their positions according to the local environment. The model also considers the impact of peer pressure on individual decision-making and introduces heterogeneity in individuals’ sensitivity to pressure, thereby systematically examining the role of both factors in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Based on this framework, we further compare our model with a scenario in which no migration mechanism is present to evaluate its impact on cooperative dynamics. The results reveal that the migration mechanism significantly promotes the evolution of cooperative behavior. Under this mechanism, higher individual sensitivity leads to an increased level of cooperation, and stronger peer pressure intensity more effectively enhances the promotion of cooperation. Additionally, the influence of population structure on cooperation frequency cannot be overlooked. An increase in vacant nodes provides cooperators with greater buffering space and more migration opportunities, making cooperative behavior more stable and facilitating its propagation within the system. These findings suggest that appropriately regulating individual mobility and reinforcing peer pressure constraints can enhance the stability and propagation of cooperative behavior, providing significant theoretical support for social governance, organizational management, and group collaboration.

Chinese Physics BVol. 34(11)
Openalex Percentile: Top 82%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.