Byzantine Stable Matching

In stable matching, one must find a matching between two sets of agents, commonly men and women, or job applicants and job positions. Each agent has a preference ordering over who they want to be matched with. Moreover a matching is said to be stable if no pair of agents prefer each other over their current matching.

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Publication Details

Published
2025-06-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1145/3732772.3733525
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
3.13
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article

Byzantine Stable Matching

Diana Ghinea, Roger Wattenhofer, Andrei Constantinescu, Marc Dufay
1 citations
Game Theory and Voting Systems
3.13
article

Byzantine Stable Matching

Diana Ghinea, Roger Wattenhofer, Andrei Constantinescu, Marc Dufay
article en
1 citations

Abstract

In stable matching, one must find a matching between two sets of agents, commonly men and women, or job applicants and job positions. Each agent has a preference ordering over who they want to be matched with. Moreover a matching is said to be stable if no pair of agents prefer each other over their current matching.

ETH Zurich (CH), Lucerne University of Applied Sciences and Arts (CH)
Openalex Percentile: Top 8%
Game Theory and Voting Systems
3.13
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