Complexity analysis of a closed-loop supply chain for power battery recycling under government subsidies

Considering government subsidies for new energy electric vehicle manufacturers, the study will construct a static game model to analyze the optimal strategies of decision-makers from the perspectives of manufacturers and retailers. It will analysis the impact of key model parameters such as government subsidy criteria, the fund returns rate and market size on optimal strategy selection. Additionally, a dynamic game model will be developed to investigate the complex behavior characteristics of decision-makers, as well as the influence of different behaviors on their complex benefits. The research results show: First, government subsidy criteria, the fund return rate and market size importantly influence the optimal pricing strategies and recycling services. Second, the stability region of the equilibrium strategy is given. Moreover, when the decision-makers 's price adjustment speed exceeds a certain threshold, the equilibrium strategy undergoes complex behaviors such as bifurcation and chaos. The time-delay feedback control method is adopted to regulate the chaos. Ultimately, based on the findings, a series of targeted management insights and recommendations are proposed, indicating that while short-term government subsidies can lead to increased profits for members, excessive subsidies in the long run can result in system chaos and profit decline.

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Publication Details

Journal
PLoS ONE
Published
2025-06-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0322888
Primary Topic
Recycling and Waste Management Techniques
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Complexity analysis of a closed-loop supply chain for power battery recycling under government subsidies

Lei Dai, Abudureheman Kadeer, Huanying He, Wang Xiao-bin
PLoS ONE
Recycling and Waste Management Techniques
article

Complexity analysis of a closed-loop supply chain for power battery recycling under government subsidies

Lei Dai, Abudureheman Kadeer, Huanying He, Wang Xiao-bin
article en

Abstract

Considering government subsidies for new energy electric vehicle manufacturers, the study will construct a static game model to analyze the optimal strategies of decision-makers from the perspectives of manufacturers and retailers. It will analysis the impact of key model parameters such as government subsidy criteria, the fund returns rate and market size on optimal strategy selection. Additionally, a dynamic game model will be developed to investigate the complex behavior characteristics of decision-makers, as well as the influence of different behaviors on their complex benefits. The research results show: First, government subsidy criteria, the fund return rate and market size importantly influence the optimal pricing strategies and recycling services. Second, the stability region of the equilibrium strategy is given. Moreover, when the decision-makers 's price adjustment speed exceeds a certain threshold, the equilibrium strategy undergoes complex behaviors such as bifurcation and chaos. The time-delay feedback control method is adopted to regulate the chaos. Ultimately, based on the findings, a series of targeted management insights and recommendations are proposed, indicating that while short-term government subsidies can lead to increased profits for members, excessive subsidies in the long run can result in system chaos and profit decline.

PLoS ONEVol. 20(6)
Xinjiang Institute of Engineering (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 83%
Recycling and Waste Management Techniques
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