Is it possible to form a rational identity? A critical reading of Habermas’ account of social identity

Habermas’ account of social identity is the most sophisticated among various deliberative and expansive democratic models and aligns with his long-standing theoretical commitment to communicative rationality that is tailored to the democratic organization of society. Taking a normative stance, he proposes a procedural account of social identity within communicative rationality, achievable only in modernity and deliberative democracy. We argue that his formulation of social identity is inadequate, given a problematic stage-based framework in his historical account of societal evolution and the insubstantial nature of social identity in his linguistic and procedural accounts of social identity. Nonetheless, Habermas’ approach can serve as a starting point to develop a more inclusive and empirically defensible conceptual framework for collective identity, grounded in robust institutional foundations and a substantive account of the political. Finally, by challenging Habermas’ separation of system and lifeworld, we argue that a rational social identity should be rooted in both domains.