Being <i>Per Se</i> and Categorical Predication

Abstract In Metaphysics Δ .7 (1017a22-30), Aristotle claims that being per se is said in as many ways as the katēgoriai . An interpretative question, where there is disagreement among scholars, concerns what is meant by ‘being per se ’ in Δ .7. I offer an answer that provides fresh insights. I argue that being per se (in Δ .7) is a being relation expressed by the ‘is’ of categorical predication. In support of this, I appeal to Aristotle’s distinction in Posterior Analytics I.22 between two ways of speaking: predicating genuinely ( haplōs ), e.g., ‘Socrates is walking’ and predicating incidentally ( kata sumbebēkos ), e.g., ‘This walking thing is Socrates’.