Not All States are Real Individuals for Spinoza

Abstract Realist interpreters argue that states are real individuals and not merely metaphorical or quasi-individuals for Spinoza. This paper argues that realism conflicts with Spinoza's conatus doctrine which is indispensable for his value theory. The conatus doctrine maintains that no individual, in itself, can be destroyed except by an external cause. Yet states can be destroyed by internal causes such as defective laws, citizens, or rulers. This is evidence that not all states are real individuals for Spinoza. After responding to objections, the paper then presents a positive view, qualified realism: some states are individuals, and some are not, on Spinoza's account. To be an individual, a state must meet the conditions for having a conatus: it must have a ratio, that is, an internal structuring by which, in itself, it produces unified effects that preserve its being.