Labour's Commitment to 1.5 Million New Homes: Housing Delivery as an Orchestrator‐Intermediary Challenge

Abstract In the UK, the new Labour government has linked the intention to deliver more homes to reform of the planning system, which is seen as a key barrier. Two assumptions inform this reform. First, the system is sound, but there are problems with its administration. Second, there are problems with how the system itself is engineered, for example, by overly constraining land supply. The first we consider a principal‐agent (P‐A) challenge, where local government must be managed to create the foundations to meet housing targets. The second, an orchestrator‐intermediary challenge, where developers are intermediaries who must be persuaded to deliver more housing while meeting a broad set of planning objectives. We look at changes already made by the government to green belt policy and argue that these are overly focussed on the P‐A challenge and are unlikely to be sufficient to change the behaviour of developers.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
The Political Quarterly
Published
2025-06-11
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923x.13551
Primary Topic
Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Labour's Commitment to 1.5 Million New Homes: Housing Delivery as an Orchestrator‐Intermediary Challenge

Nancy Holman, Alan Mace
1 links
The Political Quarterly
Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism
article

Labour's Commitment to 1.5 Million New Homes: Housing Delivery as an Orchestrator‐Intermediary Challenge

Nancy Holman, Alan Mace
article en

Abstract

Abstract In the UK, the new Labour government has linked the intention to deliver more homes to reform of the planning system, which is seen as a key barrier. Two assumptions inform this reform. First, the system is sound, but there are problems with its administration. Second, there are problems with how the system itself is engineered, for example, by overly constraining land supply. The first we consider a principal‐agent (P‐A) challenge, where local government must be managed to create the foundations to meet housing targets. The second, an orchestrator‐intermediary challenge, where developers are intermediaries who must be persuaded to deliver more housing while meeting a broad set of planning objectives. We look at changes already made by the government to green belt policy and argue that these are overly focussed on the P‐A challenge and are unlikely to be sufficient to change the behaviour of developers.

The Political Quarterly
Openalex Percentile: Top 83%
Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism
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