Compensation Levels and Collective Resistance Intentionality in Development-induced Displacement Projects: The Moderating Role of Trust in Government

Abstract: Research on the impact of a single compensation level as an economic factor in reducing collective resistance intentionality has yielded inconsistent results: both insufficient and excessively high compensation may trigger collective resistance. Additionally, trust in the government, as a political factor, plays a crucial role. However, it remains unclear whether varying compensation levels are effective and whether there are interactive effects between objective economic compensation and subjective trust in the government on collective resistance intentionality. This article explores how compensation levels and trust in the government influence collective resistance intentionality in response to development-induced displacement projects. Using China's coordinated development project as a case study, the findings reveal that both compensation levels and trust in the government reduce collective resistance intention. Trust in the government moderates the negative relationship between compensation level and collective resistance. From a financial perspective, it can be shown that past collective resistance experience and annual household income contribute to a reduction in collective resistance intentionality.