Time for a paradigm shift? Exploring competition regulation and its relationship with the rising global burden of industrial epidemics

Competition regulation plays a key role in determining firm size, market structure, and what firms can do with their market power. In this paper, we explore how competition regulation in many countries has largely tolerated rising industry concentration and market power in harmful consumer product industries, which, in turn, has likely facilitated an increase in preventable death and disease associated with such industries (ie. industrial epidemics). One important reason for this tolerance has been the rise of the 'consumer welfare' standard, which contends that competition regulators should only focus on a narrow set of concerns mostly relating to consumer price and output. Yet, recent developments shed light on potential avenues through which competition regulation could work more synergistically with public health policies and programmes. While discussions on how to leverage competition regulation along these lines are invariably contested and complex, we argue that it is critical that public health advocates engage with these discussions.

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Publication Details

Journal
Health Economics Policy and Law
Published
2025-06-11
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744133125000131
Primary Topic
Global Public Health Policies and Epidemiology
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Time for a paradigm shift? Exploring competition regulation and its relationship with the rising global burden of industrial epidemics

Sven Gallasch, Benjamin Wood, Katherine Sievert, Gary Sacks et al.
Health Economics Policy and Law
Global Public Health Policies and Epidemiology
article

Time for a paradigm shift? Exploring competition regulation and its relationship with the rising global burden of industrial epidemics

Sven Gallasch, Benjamin Wood, Katherine Sievert, Gary Sacks, Nicholas Shaxson
article en

Abstract

Competition regulation plays a key role in determining firm size, market structure, and what firms can do with their market power. In this paper, we explore how competition regulation in many countries has largely tolerated rising industry concentration and market power in harmful consumer product industries, which, in turn, has likely facilitated an increase in preventable death and disease associated with such industries (ie. industrial epidemics). One important reason for this tolerance has been the rise of the 'consumer welfare' standard, which contends that competition regulators should only focus on a narrow set of concerns mostly relating to consumer price and output. Yet, recent developments shed light on potential avenues through which competition regulation could work more synergistically with public health policies and programmes. While discussions on how to leverage competition regulation along these lines are invariably contested and complex, we argue that it is critical that public health advocates engage with these discussions.

Health Economics Policy and LawVol. 21(1)
Ministry of Economy (MK), Deakin University (AU), Center For Balanced Living (US)
Deakin University, Medical Research Council, National Health and Medical Research Council
Openalex Percentile: Top 84%
Global Public Health Policies and Epidemiology
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Time for a paradigm shift? Exploring competition regulation and its relationship with the rising global burden of industrial epidemics — Sven Gallasch, Benjamin Wood, et al. · Health Economics Policy and Law (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS