Współudział Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej i Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w procesie ustawodawczym

The article analyses the scope of the President’s competences in the legislative process in the context of cooperation and partnership with the Constitutional Tribunal. The author observes that both of these organs perform the role of ‘guardians of the Constitution’, and that, counter-intuitively, the President’s refusal to sign an unconstitutional act has a stronger impact on legislation than his legislative initiative prerogatives. In view of the fact that the Tribunal cannot act on its own initiative, the President should be guided by ‘constitutional sensitivity’ in the exercise of his competences, in the initiation of both preventive and subsequent control. The author also notes that the Constitutional Tribunal, through its jurisprudence, protects the President’s competences in order to ensure that he is able to effectively monitor the observance of the Constitution.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zeszyty Prawnicze Biura Analiz Sejmowych
Published
2025-06-06
DOI
https://doi.org/10.31268/zpbas.2024.55
Primary Topic
Polish Law and Legal System
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Współudział Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej i Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w procesie ustawodawczym

Tomasz Esmund
Zeszyty Prawnicze Biura Analiz Sejmowych
Polish Law and Legal System
article

Współudział Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej i Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w procesie ustawodawczym

Tomasz Esmund
article en

Abstract

The article analyses the scope of the President’s competences in the legislative process in the context of cooperation and partnership with the Constitutional Tribunal. The author observes that both of these organs perform the role of ‘guardians of the Constitution’, and that, counter-intuitively, the President’s refusal to sign an unconstitutional act has a stronger impact on legislation than his legislative initiative prerogatives. In view of the fact that the Tribunal cannot act on its own initiative, the President should be guided by ‘constitutional sensitivity’ in the exercise of his competences, in the initiation of both preventive and subsequent control. The author also notes that the Constitutional Tribunal, through its jurisprudence, protects the President’s competences in order to ensure that he is able to effectively monitor the observance of the Constitution.

Zeszyty Prawnicze Biura Analiz SejmowychVol. 83(3)
Instytut Ogrodnictwa – Państwowy Instytut Badawczy (PL)
Openalex Percentile: Top 84%
Polish Law and Legal System
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