Pragmatic Humanism in Practice: The Bernstein-Rorty Philosophical Conversation

this essay revisits the nearly sixty-year philosophical conversation between lifelong friends Richard J. Bernstein and Richard Rorty. To quote from Robert Westbrook's memorable and informative “A Tale of Two Dicks,” we know that “theirs was a warm, even affectionate, fraternal bond, albeit, as we shall see, not one without significant philosophical and political disagreements, vigorously expressed” (3). By Bernstein's own lights, “[n]o other contemporary philosopher has influenced me in such a creative manner. As I developed my own interpretations of pragmatism, I frequently felt I was addressing Rorty directly or indirectly—seeking to meet his penetrating challenges” (Pragmatic Turn 200). In a similar spirit, Rorty attested that “Richard Bernstein and I are almost exact contemporaries, were educated mostly in the same places by mostly the same people, have been exalted by many of the same hopes, and have been talking to one another about how to fulfill those hopes for more than fifty years” (“Philosophy as a Transitional Genre” 473). It is hard to imagine the contemporary revival of pragmatism absent their distinct but kindred voices.If, as Westbrook suggests, the legacy of one overshadows the other, my claim is that that legacy—Rorty's—and our collective understanding of it would be hugely impoverished without Bernstein's crucial clarifications and provocations. After a brief biographical sketch, I identify three periods or stages in Bernstein's relation to Rorty as he moved from being an insightful interpreter of Rorty to one of his most incisive critics and, ultimately, following Rorty's passing, a passionate defender. All three phases of interpretation, I argue, are necessary for a full picture of Rorty's oeuvre and legacy.I then turn to what we still can learn from their sustained dialogue, about Rorty and about pragmatism writ large. Inspired by Bernstein's crucial insight that “[t]he conflicts among the pragmatists are as important as anything that they share in common” (“Resurgence of Pragmatism” 824), I revisit one of Bernstein's chief criticisms of Rorty and suggest that it missed the mark—namely, that the biggest shortcoming of Rorty's pragmatism is its failure to “hammer out” normative standards to adjudicate conflicts of belief. Understanding Rortyan rationality as a cognitive-affective skill enables us to see that the kinds of standards sought by Bernstein are internal to the use of rationality within social practices and thus incapable of neutrally settling conflicts between them. Setting aside the need to “hammer out” standards as a red herring affords a glimpse of common ground between their views of the habits and virtues of epistemic and ethical communities.The “two Dicks” were born a year apart, in 1931 and 1932, with Rorty entering the world first. Their educational paths through prestigious institutions of higher learning were intimately intertwined, starting at The University of Chicago's Hutchins College. When Bernstein arrived in 1949, Rorty had just begun the master's program, having already completed the distinctive Hutchins degree in three years. The robust intellectual discourse at Chicago was legendary, with Allan Bloom, Susan Sontag, Philip Roth, and George Steiner among their classmates (Westbrook 5). Before long, the two Dicks found themselves discussing philosophy as they scrubbed dishes in the dining hall kitchen, and a lifelong friendship was formed.1Rorty left Chicago to enter the PhD program at Yale University in 1952. Bernstein followed in 1953, after two years at Columbia to augment the idiosyncratic Hutchins degree, and would earn both his MA and PhD from Yale. Their time in Yale's Philosophy Department was influential on their intellectual interests, both for its pluralistic orientation and hospitability toward pragmatism.2 Upon completion of his degree in 1956, Rorty was drafted into the army because, as he later put it, “I stupidly didn't delay my dissertation until past my twenty-sixth birthday” (qtd. in Mendieta 5). After one and a half years in the service, he landed an instructor position at Wellesley College before moving to Princeton in 1961, where he would remain for two decades. Bernstein completed his PhD in 1958, after spending time in Israel as a Fulbright Scholar, and accepted a position at Yale the same year (Westbrook 5; Bernstein, “Response to Gilya G. Schmidt” 153). After being denied tenure at Yale, and the ensuing scandal (Friedlander 337–40), Bernstein spent nearly twenty-five years at Haverford College before joining the New School in 1989, where he taught until less than two months before his passing on 4 July 2022. After Princeton, Rorty moved to the University of Virginia in 1982 and then Stanford in 1998, before retiring due to illness in 2005. Both philosophers served as president of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association: Rorty in 1979 and Bernstein in 1988.There were divergent factors in their backgrounds as well. Rorty was an only child of politically engaged intellectuals with global contacts. Their living room commonly hosted luminaries like Sidney Hook, Robert Penn Warren, A. Philip Randolph, and even a fugitive from Trotsky, John Frank (Gross 91). As Rorty explained, “I was just brought up a Trotskyite, the way people are brought up Methodists or Jews or something like that. It was just the faith of the household” (qtd. in Gross 93). Bernstein was Jewish, raised in a working-class neighborhood in Brooklyn. His parents were second-generation immigrants, and his father was a furniture salesman. Bernstein was the youngest of three and tragically lost his older brother in World War II when he was 13 (Friedlander 331–32). While neither family was well-off, Rorty no doubt benefitted from significant cultural and intellectual capital. Another contrast worth mentioning, which Bernstein often brought up in conversation, is the time Bernstein spent on the front lines of the Civil Rights Movement in 1964 Mississippi (Bernstein, “Response to Robert C. Neville” 112).This isn't the place to provide a full overview of their respective philosophical orientations and conceptions of pragmatism. Given the outright hostility to pragmatism and to Dewey in particular at the Hutchins College, Rorty and Bernstein had little exposure to the tradition until they attended Yale. Bernstein once recalled that “[w]hen we were at Yale together, I do not ever recall discussing pragmatism with Rorty” (“Response to Nancy K. Frankenberry” 99). Yet they shared a number of influential teachers and mentors within the pragmatist orbit, including John E. Smith, who first introduced Bernstein to Dewey and for whom Rorty was a graduate teaching assistant; Paul Weiss, who chaired Rorty's dissertation and supervised Bernstein's journal editorship with Weiss's The Review of Metaphysics; and other philosophers who had knowledge of pragmatism, like Rulon Wells and Brand Blanshard.3 Both Bernstein and Rorty had contact with Wilfrid Sellars and similarly named him as among their intellectual heroes (Bernstein, “Response to Vincent Colapietro” 70; Rorty, “Intellectual Autobiography” 8). They maintained a lively correspondence throughout their lives, including a 1962 letter where Bernstein asked Rorty if he was interested in co-editing a collection of writings on pragmatism, and they provided each other with critical readings and advice throughout the course of their lives.4 Rorty once quipped about Bernstein: “We share not only many enthusiasms, but the vast majority of our convictions, both philosophical and political” (“Philosophy as a Transitional Genre” 473). Among the commitments that constitute their common pragmatist ethos are anti-foundationalism, fallibilism, a social conception of the self, grounding inquiry in a community of inquirers, contingency, pluralism, and an emphasis on a spirit of “Romance” within philosophy (Westbrook 6–7).As Westbrook rightly observed, from the 1979 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature on, “every major development in Rorty's thinking was met with a long, thoughtful, fair, critical, and influential analysis by Bernstein” (5). Rorty likewise recognized that Bernstein's readings “are among the most careful, detailed, and searching criticisms of my writings. He always understands my motives and intentions perfectly, never distorts or mocks what I say, yet often that the I is (“Philosophy as a Transitional Genre” 473). as has Bernstein's relation to Rorty's views was this I into this and identify three distinct periods in Bernstein's orientation toward Rorty and his of an on Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature with Bernstein as insightful interpreter who Rorty's in a the of Rorty's and where Bernstein an of and a following Rorty's in with Bernstein in the of passionate defender. chief claim is that three phases of Bernstein's insight into Rorty's pragmatism are necessary to a full as they readings from one in a and first is in Bernstein's of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (“Philosophy in the it a do it is a that by the The is a of the spirit of a I recall Bernstein talking about often with his I have not been to an of it in his writings. to a philosophical on its through an of on and then it from Bernstein more than that on of to and In the Bernstein an of the and and the and contemporary of Rorty's of the Bernstein is not the he are incisive and including his into how Rorty and the to which he is with the of (Bernstein, in the know that Bernstein had an even on Philosophy and the Mirror of As he many years he the for Princeton University which a between two he was about on the that he and Rorty even at that had been friends for nearly three decades. he that he what Rorty was to do and it (Bernstein, “Response to Nancy K. Frankenberry” In the he that would and and other and he its the to what philosophy has been and (Bernstein, on Richard Rorty's the the not yet have the for Rorty's claim that and Dewey were three most important philosophers of our and the Mirror 5). only have that and its Bernstein it was to the how the As Bernstein later “I that it would to be one of the most the the that he would be not to (“Response to Nancy K. Frankenberry” While the on a of its own that the of Bernstein's on was with Rorty's and Bernstein Rorty's most throughout the and already had the to which is a the same a of with Rorty's or to important that had been raised by Bernstein and other was both in and in to Richard Rorty Bernstein in a essay in by a from Rorty. was he another only this time with the criticisms front and of as and a as he rightly that was an to those who had Rorty of being to the and of Westbrook what many already of and was the most of his many with Rorty's In Bernstein he was to and are not only but of he the of the Rorty's of a his of a and his to from and the and of had only Bernstein suggest that Rorty was not living up to his own commitments to and conversation, but to be one in which is no in which to and with each He even is hard to see that a between Rorty's and Rorty's passing in with the moving “Richard Rorty's and the and a yet another orientation is Bernstein as of By his own lights, the years I found Rorty as frequently as I when I felt that on him were Rorty's 200). As as Bernstein had Rorty to him about a of including one and another with “I was by how hostility is to I found once in the position of having to me is the and with which people who to know to what are to Richard Rorty his Rorty was this his lifelong for “I he has been a and that is of and his Rorty's through the of this Bernstein as something he always had in Rorty, in the Rorty's for his and the need to the of our and to those who from and Rorty's In contrast to his of Rorty's as more than an for the he to and the of the American tradition of by and “Richard Rorty's is a in which are a to the of Yet I to that Bernstein Rorty at the in Bernstein's orientation to Rorty that we as of and in what Dewey the Bernstein's or relation to and with three phases of Bernstein's to our understanding do we a of Rorty's philosophical and political where Bernstein and Rorty more the we that place on of contemporary “two the and how they and on, no doubt in the between on with Bernstein the chief in of their respective toward the tradition and “I my by of the for and his for a of I never the of that Rorty I never that one had to and and Rorty's Bernstein is about Rorty's and with the of Yet this not Bernstein's critical Westbrook Bernstein's with Rorty's (Westbrook is something to it, to the of their Rorty that Bernstein has been more politically than I doubt that we have ever about what to whom to or in what we to as a Transitional Genre” 473). Rorty their views of the relation of philosophy and that Bernstein for political I such can be only by to the of or social as a Transitional Genre” are but this to what Bernstein's most to Rorty's of Bernstein's that is in the of both Mirror and of that to my was always the most is that Rorty's pragmatism and to philosophy most at the As he put it, provide us with the of how to even the and hopes that he Rorty's As we have one of the is the where the in Rorty's the of to a of and the of (Bernstein, New Another is the normative he where Rorty to and no from Rorty no for and and even provide an to not be Bernstein was the years and to The that Rorty's pragmatism is to the to and to to what are the and he are the social practices to which we do we the from the need to be and Dewey sought to with without to or but Rorty never to and (Bernstein, in the always have that Bernstein had Rorty a and that Rorty didn't have a as I have into the of Rortyan and sought to of three of Bernstein's of interpretation, I have to is something that Bernstein me in Bernstein's is what he as the way to or through and of social (Bernstein, in the Bernstein, to Rorty philosophers from the of or and only to us in we are by and the to from or we that philosophy is at a of (“Philosophy in the To be Bernstein was not Rorty's and His has two one is about the of normative for standards for and the other Rorty's failure or to a distinctive for philosophy after the it for Bernstein to “hammer out” standards for and social practices that would us of this essay on Rorty by the is in this insight is that Bernstein has in as little as Rorty in of this in to us of the is no ground that isn't the of another of social practices with their normative he put it in of this be the at for the for a picture of way to Rortyan suggests, is to of it as the of a of as the of a which in a of this is that the standards Bernstein is after “are not of of the and of standards is a of the that this conception the standards in the of the of is of the of or what have that having the skill one to He this the of The for from is how they can through the that is a of of the skill of is no other As a “[t]he of standards is to same for Rorty's understanding of rationality as the of a of or intellectual is first the standards are as a having only The is that including Bernstein, have in thinking that standards for the of skill have a of their own from of the we this then Rorty is to is no way of the All we have to are practices and As are or is no is no way to a and a is the of such as we have in the most we can Nancy the of a between a in and in for the of contingency, or in this us to this one Bernstein and Rorty would that we can for or that are or to Bernstein's of this would to we can and do to or our by the we can to even when we that can be about what we are to on what and to as even when we that is no or standards to which we can to the (Bernstein, in the crucial the of and if they provide a for conflicts between social of such a is the between and by Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror of The that to be for Bernstein is are we to who are the and in what they are (“Philosophy in the Rorty on this that use which in the later and was not to be to in the at the time that was on the no of the of have it before it was out” and the Mirror Rorty's is that can just that was the of as he that it was a that he and that the of he was in is of and the Mirror is what other standards than the that are for Bernstein's that we who the was in the As are only social no standards of then what and other than the of practices which and of they the always for the from later is that the standards Bernstein have only a they are of they fulfill the Bernstein is of enables us to Rorty's Rorty didn't his in he conception of rationality as more as picture of inquiry as the of a of than as the of to and the normative standards of rationality are to the skill or of Rorty never was to this I it is with his In we that Rorty a to how the of Yet he that his not us without to As we he was in the of are for up a of but they do not have that can such They their from our the of on Philosophy as He to a one the that is a common ground one is still from that is as as can still the on the up once the and of the two on both and that and he this to the critical in of and between the and our to a that do to what our community would be like if it its and what we would be like as a of this Philosophy as of what more Bernstein is for as what is in is hard to with the of Rorty once “We do about or for political When such an is we it, not in of or but in of the and it of directly to Bernstein, he in that still “We social who are need to our to about and being to in the political being by our and front on which Bernstein about Rorty's pragmatism the about as Bernstein put it, can a more and when we our but to of the conflicts and that us and to a critical (“Philosophy in the Bernstein was with the of Rorty's for he explained, Rorty not to claim that one can for the His was that has to that he is the for a of a the In Bernstein's as a of this one where Rorty is the for his he an a or a not that need to be the to in way his a with at that in In one of his to Bernstein, Rorty that with Bernstein, as as I can see, is about the of in thinking about the political as to its in a and “I use for philosophy in to the that we social and Bernstein to philosophy something less than the for but something more than just in with social 99). we are to to philosophy or to standards that of the of social Rorty us to with our is an important to Rorty's own that as being by the picture of Rortyan we that standards for and are to the of rationality or is not a of what us with as Rorty and the Mirror The for as is that is always more to the of a skill with than is in the of standards for its As a skill and it social Rorty's to the of suggest he have this the of Rorty's pragmatism is to to Bernstein's first about normative only the about the of Bernstein's phases of Rorty and a picture of Rorty's pragmatism in it isn't that of Bernstein's criticisms their Rorty not as we have he rationality to the and of the and to for of discourse where shared for are absent and is The orientation of Rorty's pragmatism toward the and of to social and and the to and throughout his the for the Rorty's conception of the in of with Bernstein's about Rorty's to the as from the ethical and the of the between and Rorty's pragmatism is that in of as that even from the Bernstein Rorty for that to is more than the of a of Rorty's position By the of his Philosophy as and as that was even if still idiosyncratic in its Rortyan Rorty shared the that for Bernstein the ethos and Bernstein's (Bernstein, New on, Bernstein that is a that and what our and yet the in his own engaged pluralism, he the of the at the of Rorty's pragmatism as to to to other people, to the of our other in Bernstein, New the two up in the same place is Bernstein that not a of or but (“Philosophy in the he that Rorty had lost his for and that no how is not (Bernstein, “Richard Rorty's emphasis in Yet as we have Rorty was more than to when and his pragmatism had more normative at its than Bernstein Rorty's faith in philosophical is as a in emphasis than a major are where Bernstein recognized that is no for of He a common ground their respective of an of or In a letter to Rorty, Bernstein that be by an to the in which we the know as as he is no to that or can be to adjudicate between of what is or to be important in to Richard Rorty it as if Bernstein is the that is anything the same of or he that can a as of the of the most of what we and as a of our (Bernstein, the to Richard Rorty not from Rorty's for about the of his Rorty to more than many like he the of and with to his idiosyncratic understanding of rationality and its (“Response to Bernstein likewise about the of as to the and development of of inquiry The that both Bernstein and Rorty to the conversation by virtues and habits of and and and to not the of be not only where they but the only we can Bernstein recalled after his passing, other philosopher of the past has as lively conversation as Richard of he explained, due to Rorty's he has more than of his to philosophers to pragmatism Rorty's we is that no one more than Bernstein to philosophers to Rorty or to Rorty to to his philosophical Rorty that in of what he is the my (“Philosophy as a Transitional Genre” is no doubt that the contemporary of pragmatism, as as our understanding of Rorty's philosophical and political have benefitted from Bernstein's insightful incisive and one of Bernstein's many he that a and conception of the tradition if we it as an conversation in which are and (“Resurgence of Pragmatism” It is in this spirit that I it is crucial to three stages in the development of Bernstein's critical with Rorty's in to Rorty's The in Bernstein's in particular are without the of the the of we see that Rorty has a if not that to Bernstein's about the of normative standards and of political the that Rorty to “hammer out” and from Rorty's is in his conception of and is with of and with his that are to the in the of our social practices and of both and once that and and political and social as it It and His not have the same his to and conception of Yet for the between Bernstein and Rorty, on this they were in than they have In we a of for always their conversation