Disruptive Means and Radical Ends: Toward an Embodied Understanding of Dewey's Vision of Democracy

john dewey famously advocated for a vision of democracy as an ethical way of life. Far from viewing democracy as a static institution, Dewey imagined it as a continuous experiment in associated living, collaborative inquiry, cooperation, and adaptation. One of his key tenets was that democracy can only be achieved by democratic means. In his 1937 essay “Democracy Is Radical,” Dewey insisted that “the fundamental principle of democracy is that the ends of freedom and individuality for all can be attained only by means that accord with those ends” (22). At the time, he was writing to critique growing global movements that were justifying violent, militant, and authoritarian means in the supposed name of democracy. He aimed to counter this instrumental use by reminding us that democracy must be embodied in its methods rather than presented as a distant, disembodied goal. For Dewey, the very essence of democracy requires methods rooted in equality, participation, and adaptability. His radical insight was that democracy's transformative potential lies in maintaining a dynamic interplay between means and ends and, further, that “[t]he end of democracy is a radical end. . . . It is radical because it requires great change in existing social institutions, economic, legal, and cultural. A democratic liberalism that does not recognize these things in thought and action is not awake to its own meaning and to what that meaning demands” (22).When taken apart from the context of his radical vision of democracy, Dewey's notion of democratic means loses much of its original meaning. Too often in dominant political and philosophical discourse, “democratic means” has come to act as a shorthand for a type of watered-down deliberative democracy—an act of “coming to the table” for a pre-programmed debate of ideas. In many of these deliberative frameworks, democracy is reduced to formalized arenas of rational argumentation—calm, orderly spaces where disembodied, idealized participants reason together free from any messiness of their embodied realities. Richard Bernstein has argued that Dewey was not a fan of accounts of deliberative democracy that overemphasized rational argumentation. He writes: Some versions of ‘deliberative democracy’ tend to exaggerate the role of rational persuasion in democratic politics. There is a tendency to overemphasize the role and potential power of rational argumentation. Dewey was never happy with the way in which philosophers and political theorists characterized reason—especially when they sharply distinguished reason from emotion, desire, and passion. He preferred to speak about intelligence and intelligent action. Intelligence is not the name of a special faculty. Rather, it designates a cluster of habits and dispositions that includes attentiveness to details, imagination, and passionate commitment. What is most essential for Dewey is the embodiment of intelligence in everyday practices. (Bernstein 85; emphasis added)An impoverished understanding of democratic means not only distorts Dewey's project, but risks reinforcing existing injustices by silencing those whose anger, pain, and lived experiences defy the neat boundaries of “reasonable” debate, and by dismissing “disruptive means” such as people taking to the streets, occupying public spaces, or anything that spills out from the carefully corralled boundaries of where democracy should happen. It further overlooks the generative role of social movements, protests, and these acts of disruption that bring new voices into the public sphere. On this view, for example, the sole purpose of social movements is to bring issues to the table for discussion. As political theorist Deva Woodly notes in her introduction to Reckoning: Black Lives Matter and the Democratic Necessity of Social Movements, in 2016, President Barack Obama criticized the Black Lives Matter movement along these lines. In an article in The New York Times, he is quoted as saying that the movement was “really effective at bringing attention to problems,” but that “once you've highlighted an issue and brought it to people's attention . . . then you can't just keep on yelling at them. . . . The value of social movements and activism is to get you at the table, get you in the room, and then to start trying to figure out how the problem is to be solved.”3 Woodly turns this view on its head. She suggests that the value of social movements is not in bringing issues to the table, but rather that they offer something vital in themselves. She writes: Movements are a pragmatic politics in process; they are the performance of the political. They remind members of the polity that there is a public sphere where politics can and must take place if democracy is to be both authorized by and responsive to the people. In this way, social movements are not only instrumental, but institutionally important in themselves. They teach us how to reclaim citizenship in times when public life has become anemic or repressive, and many have forgotten that their political action is both necessary and beneficial. (Woodly 17)In this paper, I argue that realizing Dewey's radical vision of democracy requires embracing a more robust understanding of democratic means—one that invites disruption and centers the lived experiences of marginalized communities. To support this claim, I first contrast two interpretations of democratic means—the rational, deliberative model epitomized by Jürgen Habermas and an embodied, disruptive model that I will argue aligns with Dewey's pragmatism. Next, I introduce Jacques Rancière's concept of dissensus to elucidate the role of disruption in revealing and challenging systemic inequalities and Claude Lefort's conception of democracy as the “empty place of power” to strengthen our understanding of the necessity of such disruption. Finally, I engage Deva Woodly's analysis of the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL) and its development of Radical Black Feminist Pragmatism (RBFP), a political philosophy that I argue offers a necessary framework for actualizing Dewey's ethical vision.As previously stated, for Dewey, democracy is not a stable endpoint, but an evolving experiment rooted in social intelligence and collective problem solving. His conception of democracy extends well beyond electoral systems and formal institutions, requiring “the full range of human experience” to thrive (Bernstein 86). Bernstein reminds us thatAs Bernstein rightly calls out, after the linguistic turn, philosophers sought to ground democratic legitimacy in rational-discursive procedures. Jürgen Habermas, in particular, developed a robust theory of communicative rationality, positing that democratic legitimacy emerges from the “unforced force of better arguments” within an ideal speech situation (306). While Habermas's model aimed to prevent power from distorting political discourse, it inadvertently risked placing a premium on a particular mode of rationality—one often abstracted from lived experience, emotion, and historical injustice. In this idealized public sphere, participants present and evaluate reasons as if free from material constraints and social hierarchies. Critics, including Bernstein, have noted that such a model often fails to recognize that structural inequalities shape who gets to speak, who is heard, and whose experiences are deemed “rational.” As a result, rather than neutralizing power, the insistence on reason-giving can subtly reinforce it, privileging the groups already coded as rational and dismissing emotional appeals or embodied testimonies as disruptive or irrational.This limitation becomes evident in real-world contexts where structural inequalities shape who is heard and whose experiences are deemed legitimate. Consider the 2024 New Zealand parliamentary protest against a bill that threatened Māori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi—a 184-year-old treaty between the British Crown and the Māori people. Māori MP Hana-Rāwhiti Maipi-Clarke stood up, tearing up the bill and leading a group of fellow MPs and supporters in a haka—a traditional Māori ceremonial dance historically performed before a battle to demonstrate strength and unity—disrupting the parliamentary session.4 Viewed through a narrow lens of procedural deliberation, it can be seen as (and has been characterized as) disorderly, disruptive, even “childish.” Yet, from an embodied perspective, it can be understood as a powerful assertion of democratic agency that galvanized public protests across New Zealand.5With the New Zealand example in view, we can begin to see that by focusing on “reasoned consensus,” Habermas's framework seems less equipped to handle deep forms of social discord—those rooted in colonial legacies, racial oppression, and gender hierarchies that do not simply vanish because participants agree to speak “rationally.” Power structures shape who feels entitled to speak and who is asked to “translate” their demands into a language recognizable as rational to those in power. This can render invisible the moral force of anger, pain, and the urgent claims raised by social movements. Such movements confront systemic injustices that cannot be fully addressed by calm deliberation alone. Their disruptive tactics challenge the very frameworks that treat their demands as issues for neutral debate rather than immediate moral crises.Revisiting Dewey's emphasis on the embodied and experimental aspects of democracy can help to highlight the limitations of procedural models. In the next section, I take this critique further, examining Jacques Rancière's theory of dissensus, which challenges the structural exclusions embedded in democratic norms.Jacques Rancière's work can provide a useful theoretical vocabulary through which to understand these issues. His notion of democracy revolves around the idea of “dissensus”—the practice of creating a disruption or break in the sensory order of politics, which he refers to as the For the is not just the force but a for any of that their and forms of within an existing social The order a about who as a and what as a political He between and “the refers to the of the of and and the of what can be and when those from this order challenge the existing of the and their for emerges when those who are not as of the political a of their by and in that the and of the existing This of dissensus does not into a rational deliberative process; it the under which deliberation and take In this that the demands for disruptive, or passionate in the public as those by social not Rather, they are acts of democratic that challenge the idea that democracy is a of or a Such acts can the to confront and a of the of the of and Habermas on ideal for communicative rationality, Rancière's the political act of where it is This is less about procedural of and more about and the very of who is seen as a political A disembodied of democratic means on rational, deliberation to fully disruptive, embodied politics. While Habermas's ideal speech situation help us understand how reason should in a discourse, it does not fully recognize that politics often emerges by the very and that who gets to speak and reason in the first the role of in democratic life. often through emotional passionate protests, and forms of action that do not into a This does not these acts are Rather, they highlight that what as is historically and The emotional of protest can moral and injustices that a neutral Far from democracy, these can it, a of who and what issues The break with the order is not simply a disembodied of but a a way of and what was previously invisible or dissensus, that democracy's radical ends cannot be achieved by the boundaries of means. democracy only if it can even the that bring new and into the public sphere. a theoretical for the that democracy not through deliberation but through disruptive that how the existing order fails to recognize the full and of all its is not an of is the of democratic this social movements do not issues for a rational they dissensus, forms of and that deliberation rather Rancière's theory that political is when those who have been marginalized a for the existing Dewey, through his emphasis on and the of into but does not fully in the language of Rancière's dissensus, we can see that democracy's on where previously force the to new voices and democracy risks an orderly but In the next section, I introduce Claude Lefort's understanding of democracy as an “empty place of which can provide a to understand democracy this disruptive Lefort's view, power is not an or material but is It and is by the social and through which understand themselves. In the and political were was embodied in the figure of the who or This of power and but static and to this the of democracy, power becomes disembodied and in or a power becomes an “empty to and This a in the of political life and social of the “empty the of to power in a institution, or This is not a but a that democracy and sharply with the of as the to the place of power by power, and In such power is but is by a or This the of a the between public and and and and democracy and as to its freedom in a democracy is not the of but the to in the and of The of power as the of and the of The of democracy, is that it requires to the of power, these cannot and as of the with their legitimacy on to democratic and procedures. This the of democracy, as it on structures that it must critique and it to and movements often to the and to the place with a vision of power. that such democracy's essence by spaces for and To democracy, it is essential to the of and the in its concept of democracy as the place of power offers a of political and its to the and of democracy, its and in the of At the time, his work as a against to power or spaces for Lefort's insight with Dewey's As previously stated, for Dewey, democracy's radical end was never fully it as a which must A democracy that is or has to be The “empty is what new new movements, and new of to democracy and responsive to historical this perspective, the democratic means that Dewey must be and to the the next section, I how Dewey's on the movement this of democratic means. His of the necessity for methods in to a lens through which to understand the of a on when Dewey was asked if he was in of methods to in the his was as has not methods to be necessary in this they are not they are I do not to of but it is the of political life to under great This the the way of that they were in is but it is It is not the that the ends the but it is the that the means must to their and the This suggests that we must evaluate democratic means in of their rational deliberation be protests, and emotional appeals will be As the political context has time, I that as Dewey was of those who to public reason to emotion, he be of those who to place and boundaries as to the democratic methods and deemed necessary to bring about radical social to understand which calls for which is something that cannot be by Dewey it requires an ethical to and to for a full of the this framework cannot on disembodied or a to Rather, it must from the lived experiences of those who not be in the political “the of to it in Black those in “the of was by in her Feminist to The idea the of the in theory and activism from the experiences of those at the to those at the of and whose experiences are often This framework for an that the of marginalized groups to a more and understanding of and by Black such as and the the idea of from to is that an movement must the and At its the calls theory and practice to the of the group and the experiences of those who are or is not just a a of is a place of potential radical of on the of dominant social people who in the can the and structural injustices in a way that those occupying the often This does not that the should be Rather, it to a systemic in which the has been as The is an and political movement that how forms of how is by a than focusing on issues for or rights for those with to the to systemic public to and As those at the are not a experiences and can a the of across marginalized that a the of This support that across of and The is that by the issues of the most becomes more and for understanding of democratic means the of in the lived of those most by systemic It is in this context that the of Radical Black Feminist Pragmatism as a vital framework for democratic on this for and Deva Woodly's analysis of the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL) how social movements can transformative political rooted in the lived experiences of marginalized communities. As previously when Obama criticized the Black Lives Matter movement in for rather than bringing issues to a rational he the impoverished view of democratic means that Woodly (and to This view the value of social movements or disruptive means in their to an for procedural deliberation rather than as vital democratic who the public sphere by new and new of in that social movements the essential of pragmatic imagination, social and democratic into a public sphere that has Such movements democracy, its range of and emotional She writes: of democracy political times and . . . have that democracy is on the idea that the people will and tendency power and in the of the is work that requires and often from the (Woodly the of the Movement for Black Lives Woodly suggests that the of this movement has been not only to the public sphere, but to a political which calls Radical Black Feminist In this does work for the meaning of the or to the a mode of Black the ethical and is a mode of that action. rather than is the in this philosophy becomes does it to from both Dewey's as social intelligence and democratic and radical Black this philosophy then us to from the an lens to what of institutions, and habits of thought be for occupying the most marginalized in our to it requires that we take action to us to that As Woodly of Black the most immediate and important is Black a that on that that how we as well as the or of must be at the of our analysis and our political (Woodly emphasis key of Woodly's can be as a of radical that to Dewey's conception of democracy, the interplay between theory and practice and that meaning and value through their It can be Bernstein reminds as to the of that Dewey was in is understood as a of critique of where critique is on a of these lived as a Black and a deep critique and understanding of her in the to her immediate when was in from her own writes: I the of Black The of a Black They are not They are not They are not I cannot keep from that have to their and notion that they be of any but around in their we have be out by any who it to their at any in any there be there will be all of and and They to a with a I with that this is that this is not This is a that has the of Black the (Woodly notes most Black who are of her is to from what can her in the at on both She writes: to and this and They human in the of They are both their and their that this idea the What that means to is that this is to to to to in (Woodly can be as a for radical demands transformative action. It to systems the and racial rather than simply them. The an that cannot just the order as a it by a moral vision that on the the What to Dewey's vision of democracy is the ethical by Black which I have argued it to an understanding of what means are deemed necessary to the than from and how they to marginalized with the and embodied of those most by injustice. the of any theory or idea is in the of collective this principle help it offer a it the and of the most it and it is or this pragmatic which is and the political philosophy dynamic and responsive rather than Radical Black Feminist Pragmatism a powerful lens through which to understand how democratic means and ends at the of lived the lived of Black people and the of marginalized this political philosophy calls out and that are often invisible by its on the lived of Black the political philosophy offers a framework from which to act As Woodly Radical Black is and it calls out and because that our political tendency is to the that this philosophy is from the lived of Black should not what the vision has to offer the idea that we to thrive because life is and the only way to a and where this is is to to change the lived of the most marginalized in the of what we all (Woodly democratic means through the lens of Radical Black Feminist we see how and rooted in the lived experiences of those on the can democracy. This the for a of an embodied democratic that can the of emotion, and disruptive action as essential in the of collective and the of have been for an of Dewey's democratic a more radical political than it is as we Dewey's radical insight was that democracy's transformative potential lies in maintaining a dynamic interplay between means and and further that “[t]he end of democracy is a radical end. . . . It is radical because it requires great change in existing social institutions, economic, legal, and cultural. A democratic liberalism that does not recognize these things in thought and action is not awake to its own meaning and to what that meaning demands” for radical does not that or should change The of a is to the and of radical systemic The idea is that or structures is not a it is more the of a that cannot demands and it is work that requires and from the (Woodly way of that people in be I not that Dewey for a disruption of the that on when supporters of political more a of the democratic I that when are Black people in and our is as a of argue that it is the of political life to place to value on Black This the I argue that those in the movement way of that they were in I that even the of on that have taken or disruptive action to bring attention to the of the lived of Black should not be seen as of the necessary of democratic is not to reason or rational deliberation but to understand that they must be of a democratic that includes passionate protests, embodied and disruptive that challenge the This more democratic the between reason and emotion, between procedural order and passionate disruption. in this view, is not simply a of It is a dynamic experiment in collective radical as equality, and the of means that the of politics beyond rational that come from that are emotional as well as rational, disruptive as well as we democracy's to and the it than boundaries to embodied, or participation, we that these very forms of political action are In we democratic means with radical democracy and that for a more just and In the legitimacy and necessity of these we Dewey's and come to a radical democracy.