The Impact of Equity Incentives on Corporate Performance—Mediating Role of Managerial Short-Termism

本研究聚焦于2014年至2023年期间中国所有A股上市的非金融、非房地产公司，致力于探究股权激励对企业绩效的作用及其内在机理，采用多元回归分析和双向固定效应模型，通过实证分析，检验了股权激励、管理者短视主义与企业绩效这三者之间的关系。研究结果显示：股权激励与企业绩效之间存在着显著的正相关，即随着股权激励的实施，企业的经营绩效也会随之提高。此外，管理者短视主义在股权激励与企业绩效之间扮演着部分中介作用。具体而言，股权激励能够抑制管理者过度关注短期利益的倾向，促使其更多地关注企业的长期发展目标，从而提升整体企业绩效。研究还发现，股权激励在提高企业绩效的同时，有助于缓解管理者短视主义带来的负面影响，增强企业的持续竞争力。本文的结论为理解股权激励在提升企业绩效中的作用提供了新的视角，并为企业制定更加有效的激励机制提供了理论依据。This study focuses on all non-financial and non-real estate A-share listed companies in China from 2014 to 2023, aiming to explore the effect of equity incentives on corporate performance and its underlying mechanism. By employing multiple regression analysis and a two-way fixed effects model, this paper empirically examines the relationship among equity incentives, managerial short-termism, and corporate performance. The research findings reveal a significant positive correlation between equity incentives and corporate performance, indicating that the implementation of equity incentives leads to an improvement in business performance. Additionally, managerial short-termism plays a partial mediating role between equity incentives and corporate performance. Specifically, equity incentives can curb managers’ excessive focus on short-term interests, encouraging them to pay more attention to the long-term development goals of the enterprise, thereby enhancing overall corporate performance. The study also finds that equity incentives not only improve corporate performance but also help alleviate the negative impacts of managerial short-termism, strengthening the enterprise’s sustained competitiveness. The conclusions of this paper provide a new perspective for understanding the role of equity incentives in enhancing corporate performance and offer a theoretical basis for enterprises to formulate more effective incentive mechanisms.