The Epistemic Insignificance of Doxastic Wronging

We sometimes wrong others through our actions. Can we also wrong others in thought? If it is possible to wrong others in thought, what impact does such wronging have on the norms governing belief formation and revision? For example, is it permissible (or perhaps even required) for us to withhold forming a belief about a person if that belief would wrong them?

Authors

David DiDomenico

Publication Details

Journal: Southwest Philosophy Review
Published: 2025-01-01
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202541113
Primary Topic: Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Type: article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact: 0.00

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article

The Epistemic Insignificance of Doxastic Wronging

David DiDomenico

Jan 1, 2025

Southwest Philosophy Review

Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

article

The Epistemic Insignificance of Doxastic Wronging

David DiDomenico

January 1, 2025article en

Abstract

Southwest Philosophy ReviewVol. 41(1)

Openalex Percentile: Top 87%

Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

DOI Source OpenAlex

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The Epistemic Insignificance of Doxastic Wronging — David DiDomenico · Southwest Philosophy Review (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS