How Not to Not Change the Subject (and How to Actually Not Change the Subject)

In 2015, ‘marriage’ was redefined in the United States to include same-sex couples. In conceptual engineering, this is often assumed to be a paradigm case of Sally Haslanger’s (2020a; 2020b) semantic amelioration. Semantic amelioration changes a concept’s content to make it better. In the case of [MARRIAGE], [MARRIAGE]’s content was broadened to include same-sex couples – which, many contend, made it morally better. Semantic amelioration faces the following challenge, however: Doesn’t changing a concept’s content ‘change the subject?’ By broadening [MARRIAGE]’s content to include same-sex couples in 2015, didn’t we replace [MARRIAGE] with a new concept that sounds and looks like [MARRIAGE] but nevertheless isn’t [MARRIAGE] – something like, [MARRIAGE*]? This is the topic continuity problem (TCP). Here, TCP assumes content essentialism about concepts, i.e., that a concept’s content is essential to it. Thus, since semantic amelioration changes concepts’ contents to make them better, semantic amelioration necessarily replaces concepts, according to this version of TCP. Haslanger recently resists this notion, however. Instead of embracing content essentialism about concepts, Haslanger embraces functional essentialism about concepts – that a concept’s function is essential to it. And since semantic amelioration leaves a concept’s function unchanged, Haslanger denies that semantic amelioration is conceptual replacement. In this paper, I argue that Haslanger’s functional essentialism integrally links concepts’ functions to their contents, such that changing a concept’s content requires changing its function, on Haslanger’s account. Therefore, semantic amelioration still replaces concepts even on Haslanger’s functional essentialism. I think this is avoided, however, if we incorporate Amie Thomasson’s (2020) recent work on concepts into Haslanger’s. Combining Thomasson’s work with Haslanger’s yields a new functional essentialism about concepts – called proper functional essentialism. Proper functional essentialism allows that some functional changes in concepts don’t replace them, and hence, it perhaps reveals how to actually not change the subject in semantic amelioration.

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Publication Details

Journal
Southwest Philosophy Review
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20254118
Primary Topic
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Type
article
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article

How Not to Not Change the Subject (and How to Actually Not Change the Subject)

JoAnne Marie Mancini
Southwest Philosophy Review
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
article

How Not to Not Change the Subject (and How to Actually Not Change the Subject)

JoAnne Marie Mancini
article en

Abstract

In 2015, ‘marriage’ was redefined in the United States to include same-sex couples. In conceptual engineering, this is often assumed to be a paradigm case of Sally Haslanger’s (2020a; 2020b) semantic amelioration. Semantic amelioration changes a concept’s content to make it better. In the case of [MARRIAGE], [MARRIAGE]’s content was broadened to include same-sex couples – which, many contend, made it morally better. Semantic amelioration faces the following challenge, however: Doesn’t changing a concept’s content ‘change the subject?’ By broadening [MARRIAGE]’s content to include same-sex couples in 2015, didn’t we replace [MARRIAGE] with a new concept that sounds and looks like [MARRIAGE] but nevertheless isn’t [MARRIAGE] – something like, [MARRIAGE*]? This is the topic continuity problem (TCP). Here, TCP assumes content essentialism about concepts, i.e., that a concept’s content is essential to it. Thus, since semantic amelioration changes concepts’ contents to make them better, semantic amelioration necessarily replaces concepts, according to this version of TCP. Haslanger recently resists this notion, however. Instead of embracing content essentialism about concepts, Haslanger embraces functional essentialism about concepts – that a concept’s function is essential to it. And since semantic amelioration leaves a concept’s function unchanged, Haslanger denies that semantic amelioration is conceptual replacement. In this paper, I argue that Haslanger’s functional essentialism integrally links concepts’ functions to their contents, such that changing a concept’s content requires changing its function, on Haslanger’s account. Therefore, semantic amelioration still replaces concepts even on Haslanger’s functional essentialism. I think this is avoided, however, if we incorporate Amie Thomasson’s (2020) recent work on concepts into Haslanger’s. Combining Thomasson’s work with Haslanger’s yields a new functional essentialism about concepts – called proper functional essentialism. Proper functional essentialism allows that some functional changes in concepts don’t replace them, and hence, it perhaps reveals how to actually not change the subject in semantic amelioration.

Southwest Philosophy ReviewVol. 41(1)
Openalex Percentile: Top 87%
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
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How Not to Not Change the Subject (and How to Actually Not Change the Subject) — JoAnne Marie Mancini · Southwest Philosophy Review (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS