Is There a Non-Reductionist Account of Second Person Thought?

Second person thought is a particular kind of thought involved in the presentation of another person, often expressed by the pronoun “you.” This Paper explores the possibility of a non-reductionist account of second person thought. Thinking about “you” appears distinct from thinking about “I,” “it,” and “he/she,” but whether we can give an account of second person thought independent of other kinds of thought remains open. According to the demonstrative account, the occurrence of “you” in thought is reducible to a demonstrative, namely “that person addressed,” and has no particular relation to thought. By contrast, many others propose independent and hence original accounts of second person thought. I focus on two versions of such anti-reductionist views, which respectively stem from a Kantian and a Hegelian standpoint. I argue that although both approaches avoid reducing “you” to a demonstrative, neither succeeds in offering an original account of the you-thought.