Bringing Words to Aspects

Avner Baz (2020a) argues that Wittgensteinian aspects aren’t instances of concepts. Baz’s interpretation contrasts with the received view on aspect perception. For commentators of Wittgenstein, aspect-perception is a case of conceptualization. In contrast, Baz argues that seeing something as f is not seeing it under the concept f. In this paper I defend this claim against a recent objection. I start in Section 1 by presenting Baz’s argument. Next, in Section 2 I discuss an objection from Reshef Agam-Segal. Agam-Segal (2019) objects to Baz that he cannot explain why we bring a word to an aspect without smuggling in the concept. I will call this the connection-making problem. In Section 3 I argue that a compelling and plausible solution is available to Baz to answer the connection-making problem. For that purpose I develop a parallel with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “speaking speech.”