Legal Regulation of Collusive Practices in the E-Commerce Economy: Reconsidering the Retention or Abolition of Existing Rules

《民法典》第一百五十四条对恶意串通规则的规定较为模糊，需从解释论层面进行进一步细化。恶意串通行为包括主观和客观构成要件，主观上要求行为人和相对人具有真实的恶意，客观上要求对第三人合法权益造成实际损害。其适用范围局限于行为人和相对人恶意串通损害特定第三人债权利益。法律效果是相对无效。据此，恶意串通和双方虚假行为、债权人撤销权制度、公序良俗原则相比存在独立意义。电子经济关系复杂、信息不对称、行为隐蔽性强，恶意串通对第三人权益的侵害更具结构性特征。该行为同时符合共同侵权行为的构成要件，受损害的第三人亦可采用侵权法救济思路请求行为人和相对人就其损失承担连带赔偿责任。恶意串通规则下的法律行为效力救济和侵权法救济的侧重点不同，前者强调恢复原状，后者强调损害赔偿，两者具有互补性。在平台化交易结构中，恶意串通规则为第三人提供多元救济路径，具有制度上的独立价值。Article 154 of the Civil Code provides a relatively vague framework for regulating collusive conduct, necessitating further doctrinal clarification. Collusion involves both subjective malicious intent and objective harm to the legitimate interests of a third party. Its application is limited to instances where the actor and counterparty jointly intend to impair specific creditor interests, rendering the legal act relatively invalid. Compared with doctrines such as sham transactions, actio pauliana, and public policy clauses, the collusion rule retains distinct normative value. In the context of e-commerce—marked by complex relations, information asymmetry, and concealed behaviors—collusion poses more structural threats to third-party rights. Such conduct often satisfies the criteria for joint tort liability, enabling affected parties to seek joint compensation. While the collusion rule emphasizes invalidation of legal acts, tort law focuses on damage compensation; both approaches are complementary. Within platform-based transaction structures, the collusion rule offers diversified remedies and maintains institutional significance.