Ectogenesis, gestational preferences and the social coercion argument

This article challenges a subtle critique of ectogenesis-what I call the "social coercion argument" (SCA). The SCA holds that if ectogenesis becomes a standard gestational option, those who prefer pregnancy might be pressured into adopting it, thereby infringing on their autonomy and reinforcing inequality. On this view, ectogenesis might not be a morally sound solution to gender inequality. I first analyze the SCA within the liberal framework that underpins it. While its descriptive claim-that future women who prefer pregnancy may face pressure-may be valid, it cannot justify discounting the emancipatory potential of ectogenesis. I then examine some women's preference for pregnancy over ectogenesis through feminist insights into adaptive preferences (APs). I argue that such preferences may be harmful and shaped by injustice, suggesting that gestational preferences are dynamic, and that addressing gender inequality requires strategies beyond cultural and social inclusivity. I conclude that the SCA's core concern should be separated from the ethical evaluation of ectogenesis and addressed by continually "levelling up" choices.